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Stepping into the Shoes of the Department of 
Justice: The Unusual, Necessary, and Hopeful 
Path the Illinois Attorney General Took to 
Require Police Reform in Chicago 
Lisa Madigan 
Cara Hendrickson 
Karyn L. Bass Ehler1 
 “[W]e can’t continue to let this go on. Someone has to have the will, 
someone has to have the serious will, to want to have this change….”—
Testimony of Karl Brinson, President of Chicago West Side Branch of 
NAACP, during the fairness hearing.2  
“The decree takes an important step forward in the City of Chicago’s 
ongoing efforts to repair the damaged relationship between its police 
department and members of the community whom the department serves 
and protects. But it is a beginning, not an end.” —Judge Robert M. Dow, 
Jr., State of Illinois v. City of Chicago.3 
After a long and tragic history of mistrust between police and residents in 2017, 
Chicago (the City) was on the precipice of a dramatic change within its police department. 
The City had recently faced months of outrage and uproar in the wake of a police shooting 
of a young African American man named Laquan McDonald. Following an investigation 
 
1 Lisa Madigan was the Attorney General of the state of Illinois from 2003 to 2019; she is currently a 
partner at Kirkland & Ellis LLP. Prior to serving as Attorney General, Ms. Madigan was an Illinois state 
senator, an attorney at Sachnoff & Weaver, and a teacher and community organizer. Cara Hendrickson was 
the Chief of the Public Interest Division in the Illinois Attorney General’s Office from 2014 to 2019; she is 
currently the Executive Director at Business and Professional People for the Public Interest (BPI). Karyn L. 
Bass Ehler was the Chief of the Civil Rights Bureau in the Illinois Attorney General’s Office from 2015 to 
2019; she is currently a partner and head of the Civil Rights Practice Group at Grant & Eisenhofer, P.A. 
The authors also wish to acknowledge the team of lawyers and staff at the Illinois Attorney General’s 
Office who worked on the police reform team. We gratefully appreciate the tireless efforts of Gary Caplan, 
Cynthia Flores, Shareese Pryor, Matt Martin, Leigh Richie, Bria Scudder, Ann Spillane, Stevi Steines, 
Brent Stratton, Mikiko Thelwell, Chris Wells, Jeff VanDam, and Thomas Verticchio. The authors thank 
Munir Meghjee, Patrick Arenz, Kate Jaycox, along with their team at Robins Kaplan, for their commitment 
to this litigation as our pro bono partners. In addition, the authors wish to thank Lisa Scruggs of Duane 
Morris, for her invaluable help in the independent monitor selection process. The views expressed in this 
article are those of the authors alone and do not represent the opinions of any entity with which we have 
been or are now affiliated.     
2 Testimony of Karl Brinson, President of West Side Branch of NAACP, during the fairness hearing. 
Transcript of Proceedings—Fairness Hearing Before the Hon. Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., Oct. 24, 2018, 
Vol. 1-B at 104: 19–22. 
3 Illinois v. City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260, 2019 WL 398703, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 31, 2019).  
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into the Chicago Police Department (CPD), then-U.S. Attorney General Loretta Lynch 
stood with then-Mayor Rahm Emanuel and pledged to finally do the hard work of police 
reform through a court-ordered and court-enforced consent decree. We, along with many 
Chicagoans, hoped for change. 
But in a few short months, those hopes were dashed. President Trump appointed Jeff 
Sessions as the new U.S. Attorney General. He disagreed that the U.S. Department of 
Justice (DOJ) had any role in enforcing civil rights violations by police departments. At 
Chicago’s City Hall, the importance of pursuing enforceable reform was shifting. Mayor 
Emanuel began pursuing an out-of-court agreement promising reforms within CPD that 
lacked enforceability mechanisms. After numerous failed attempts at police reform, 
Chicago would continue under a status quo that for too long has endangered residents and 
police officers alike. 
In our capacity at the time as the Illinois Attorney General and two of her top 
deputies, we took action, believing that our office was in the best position to make this 
moment in Chicago different this time around.  
This Article looks at the history of policing in Chicago, how the police shooting of 
Laquan McDonald galvanized Chicagoans—particularly African American youth—to 
demand real, lasting change, and how our lawsuit finally brought enforceable police reform 
for the benefit of communities across the City.  
I. CHICAGO’S POLICE MISCONDUCT PROBLEM 
A. Decades of Widespread Misconduct by CPD and Failed Attempts at Reform 
To understand the decades of misconduct by the Chicago Police Department is to 
understand the true challenges of real reform. We knew that change would not be easy, but 
our determination for finding a better way in Chicago at this critical moment in time was 
unwavering.  
The CPD is the second-largest municipal police department in the United States.4 
Significant and wide-ranging problems with Chicago policing have been well-documented 
for more than fifty years, and in African-American and immigrant communities, police-
community relations throughout Chicago’s history have often been strained.5 National 
attention on CPD stretches at least as far back as 1968, when the nation watched images of 
Chicago police officers beating demonstrators at the Democratic National Convention.6 
 
4 With over 12,400 officers at the end of 2017, it is second in size only to the New York City Police 
Department. CPD serves 2.7 million residents of the City of Chicago and is responsible for an area of 231.1 
square miles. CPD is divided into twenty-two police districts, each led by a commander who oversees a 
district. In 2016, it responded to 2,647,935 calls for service. CHI. POLICE DEP’T, ANN. REP. 2017 21 (2017), 
https://home.chicagopolice.org/wp-content/uploads/2019/03/Chicago-Police-Department-Annual-Report-
2017.pdf; Police Employment, Officers Per Capita Rates for U.S. Cities, GOVERNING, 
https://www.governing.com/gov-data/safety-justice/police-officers-per-capita-rates-employment-for-city-
departments.html (last updated July 2, 2018).  
5 Spencer Ackerman, Inside Chicago’s Legacy of Police Abuse: Violence ‘as Routine as Traffic Lights’, 
THE GUARDIAN (Mar. 3, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2015/mar/03/chicago-police-
violence-homan-square.html.   
6 Caitlin Gibson, What Happened in Chicago in 1968, and Why is Everyone Talking About It Now?, WASH. 
POST (July 18, 2016), https:/www.washingtonpost.com/news/arts-and-entertainment/wp/2016/07/18/what-
happened-in-chicago-in-1968-and-why-is-everyone-talking-about-it-now.html.  




Shortly thereafter, in December 1969, with significant investigative aid from the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation (FBI), and under the direction of the Cook County State’s 
Attorney, CPD raided the home of Black Panther Party leader and activist Fred Hampton 
and killed the unarmed Hampton and his fellow Black Panther activist Mark Clark.7        
In 1973, a blue ribbon panel led by former United States Congressman Ralph 
Metcalfe identified a pattern of use of excessive force and other abuse by police directed 
disproportionately at Chicago’s African American community.8 The Metcalfe Panel found 
that 75% of the people killed by CPD officers in 1969 and 1970 were African Americans,9 
even though African Americans composed only a third of Chicago’s population.10 In 1969 
and 1970, the rate of officer-involved civilian deaths in Chicago was three times that of 
New York, Los Angeles, or Detroit.11 The panel concluded that it was “the basic law 
enforcement policy of [CPD] that aggressive police conduct toward citizens is desirable 
and legitimate,” and that the Internal Affairs Division, the Superintendent, and the Police 
Board did not “rigorously enforce [] among their subordinates proper standards of conduct 
toward civilians.”12     
Only a year earlier, in 1972, CPD promoted Officer Jon Burge to detective and 
assigned him to Area Two on Chicago’s South Side.13 Over the nearly two decades that 
followed, Burge and his subordinates at Area Two tortured and abused over 100 African 
Americans in order to coerce confessions.14   
After substantial community outcry, complaints from lawyers and community 
members, and significant investigative journalism, two CPD employees in the late 1980s 
conducted an investigation of Burge’s activities and ultimately concluded that “the 
preponderance of the evidence is that abuse did occur and that it was systemic. The time 
span involved covers more than ten years . . . Particular command members were aware of 
the systemic abuse and perpetuated it either by actively participating in same or failing to 
take any action to bring it to an end.”15   
In response to this investigation, however, the City’s leadership largely dismissed 
the investigation’s conclusions. CPD’s Superintendent at the time claimed that any 
assertion that command officers were aware of the abuse was an “outright lie.” Further, 
Mayor Richard M. Daley, who served as the Cook County State’s Attorney from 1981 to 
1989 and did nothing in response to reports of Burge’s abusive tactics,16 referred to the 
 
7 Police Kill Two Members of the Black Panther Party, HISTORY.COM (Nov. 13, 2009), 
https://www.history.com/this-day-in-history/police-kill-two-members-of-the-black-panther-party.html. 
8 METCALFE BLUE RIBBON PANEL, THE MISUSE OF POLICE AUTHORITY IN CHICAGO 2–18 (1972), 
https://chicagopatf.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/01/metcalfe-report-1972.pdf.  
9 Id. at 30. 
10 Id. at 45.  
11  Id. at 30.  
12 Id. at 32, 34.  
13 John Conroy, Tools of Torture, CHI. READER (Feb. 3, 2005), 
https://www.chicagoreader.com/chicago/tools-of-torture/Content?oid=917876.html. 
14 POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM: RESTORING TRUST BETWEEN 
THE CHICAGO POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 34 (Apr. 2016), https://chicagopatf.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/PATF_Final_Report_4_13_16-1.pdf. 
15 CHI. POLICE DEP’T OFF. OF PROF. STANDARDS, SPECIAL PROJECT CONCLUSION REPORT 6 (1990), 
https://peopleslawoffice.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/Goldston-Report-with-11.2.90-Coversheet.pdf. 
16 David Jackson, 13 Years of Cop Torture Alleged, CHI. TRIB., (Feb. 8, 1992), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-xpm-1992-02-08-9201120603-story.html. 
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investigation as “allegations, rumors, stories, things like that.”17 Despite revelations of the 
systemic torture perpetuated by Burge and his subordinates, CPD did not meaningfully 
revise its policies and programs to disincentivize officers from using excessive force 
against residents, from using force disproportionately against African Americans and 
Latinos, or from neglecting to report incidents in which they witnessed misconduct 
committed by fellow officers. City taxpayers have paid more than $115 million for the 
decades-long torture scandal tied to former police Commander Jon Burge.18    
In yet another attempt at reform, in 1997, Mayor Richard M. Daley appointed a 
Commission on Police Integrity after seven members of CPD were indicted on charges of 
conspiracy, racketeering, and extortion.19 The Commission recommended extensive 
reforms to CPD’s hiring, training, and accountability processes.20   
Fast forward seventeen years, and the City had by that time paid out hundreds of 
millions of dollars in police settlements.21 In 2014, the City commissioned a report, 
completed pro bono by a national law firm and global consulting firm, to examine the 
accountability systems for CPD.22 The resulting report recommended sweeping reforms to 
CPD’s process for supervising and disciplining officers.23 However, CPD did not adopt any 
of the recommendations in this city-commissioned report.24 The status of the Department 
also reflected the decades of the chronic underinvestment by the City in CPD. For example, 
prior to 2016, other than firearms qualification, CPD did not provide annual, mandatory 
training of any kind for its officers.25 
None of these reports, completed over decades, resulted in the widespread reform of 
CPD that each successive expert report recommended. Rather, while each examination 
repeated similarly alarming observations and reform recommendations, with the 
recommendations repeatedly unheeded, many of the realities of policing within the 
Department remained unchanged. Indeed, between 2008 and 2015, 74% of individuals shot 
by CPD officers were African American, a proportion virtually identical to the percentage 
in the Metcalfe report nearly four decades earlier.26 Further, a 2015 study by the ACLU of 
Illinois concluded that between May 2014 and August 2014, African Americans 
represented 72% of all Terry stops in Chicago, despite constituting only 32% of Chicago’s 
 
17 Id. 
18 Editorial Board, Lean in on that Police Consent Decree, CHI. TRIB., (July 20, 2018), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/opinion/editorials/ct-edit-consent-decree-rahm-police-20180718-
story.html. 
19 CITY OF CHI. POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, REPORT ON THE COMMISSION ON POLICE INTEGRITY 
2 (1997), https://chicagopatf.org/2016/02/22/new-report-on-the-commission-on-police-integrity-1997/.  
20 Id. 
21 How Chicago Racked up a $662 Million Police Misconduct Bill, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Mar. 20, 2016, 7:00 
AM), https://www.chicagobusiness.com/article/20160320/NEWS07/160319758/how-chicago-racked-up-a-
662-million-police-misconduct-bill.html. 
22 RON SAFER ET AL., PREVENTING AND DISCIPLINING POLICE MISCONDUCT: AN INDEPENDENT REVIEW AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS CONCERNING CHICAGO’S POLICE DISCIPLINARY SYSTEM 1–2 (2014). 
23 Id. 
24 U.S. DEP’T of JUST. CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION, INVESTIGATION OF THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT 72–
77, 80 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925846/download. 
25 POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 13–14. 
26 Id. at 25. 




population. Additionally, the report showed that African Americans and Latinos were 
stopped at disproportionately high rates outside of minority communities.27   
Between 2010 and 2014, Chicago police officers shot and killed seventy people28—
more than local officers did in any of the other ten most-populous cities in the country.29 
The statistics for less-lethal use of force are similar: for example, between 2012 and 2015, 
approximately 76% of the 1,886 individuals tasered by CPD officers were African 
Americans.30 
B. Laquan McDonald is Killed by Officer Jason Van Dyke 
The longstanding policing problems in CPD reached a tipping point, on November 
19, 2015, when a Cook County Circuit Court Judge ordered the City to release the video 
of a police-involved shooting.31 The long sought-after video depicted an incident from the 
night of October 20, 2014, when CPD officer Jason Van Dyke fatally shot Laquan 
McDonald, a seventeen-year-old African American young man who was walking away 
from police officers while carrying a knife.   
The video showed the officer firing sixteen shots into McDonald within thirty 
seconds of arriving on the scene. McDonald was standing approximately fifteen feet from 
officers and walking erratically as he held a knife. There were eight officers on the scene, 
and the request for backup came specifically as a request for a taser because none of the 
eight officers on the scene had one. According to the criminal proffer against Jason Van 
Dyke, “[a]n analysis of the video establishes that 14 to 15 seconds passed from the time 
[Van Dyke] fired his first shot to clear visual evidence of a final shot. For approximately 
13 of those seconds, McDonald [wa]s lying on the ground.”32    
In addition to the video captured by the dashboard-mounted cameras in CPD 
vehicles, a nearby Burger King restaurant had a series of outdoor security cameras, 
including one located less than 100 yards from the location of the shooting.33  However, 
the security footage from the camera had a gap of eighty-six minutes that covered the 
duration of the shooting.34      
The Chicago police union spokesperson, Pat Camden, said after the shooting that 
“[t]he officers are responding to somebody with a knife in a crazed condition, who stabs 
 
27 ACLU OF ILL., STOP AND FRISK IN CHICAGO 3, 7, 9–10 (Mar. 2015), https://www.aclu-
il.org/sites/default/files/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/ACLU_StopandFrisk_6.pdf. 
28 Andrew Schroedter, Fatal Shootings by Chicago Police: Tops Among Biggest U.S. Cities, BETTER GOV’T 
ASS’N (July 26, 2015), https://www.bettergov.org/news/fatal-shootings-by-chicago-police-tops-among-
biggest-us-cities/. 
29 Id. 
30 POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY TASK FORCE, supra note 14, at 36. 
31 Megan Crepeau et al., How the Day Unfolded: Inside the Courtroom for Former Chicago Police Officer 
Jason Van Dyke's Sentencing, CHI. TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2019), 
https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/breaking/ct-met-laquan-mcdonald-jason-van-dyke-sentencing-
20190118-story.html. 
32 People’s Factual Proffer in Support of Setting Bond, Illinois v. Van Dyke, No. 15-1278:23 (Ill. Cir. Ct. 
filed Jan. 24, 2015). 
33 Carol Marin & Don Moseley, Missing Minutes from Security Video Raises Questions, NBC CHI. (May 
26, 2015), https://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/laquan-mcdonald-investigation-305105631.html. 
34 Id. After the shooting, police officers who were canvassing the area for additional witness and 
investigative information obtained access to the security videos at the Burger King, which raised questions 
as to whether the police officers tampered with the security footage. 
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out tires on a vehicle and tires on a squad car. You obviously aren’t going to sit down and 
have a cup of coffee with them. He is a very serious threat to the officers, and he leaves 
them no choice at that point but to defend themselves.”35 
In April 2015, the City Council approved a $5 million settlement with the McDonald 
family to resolve legal claims prior to a lawsuit even being filed.36  
In August 2015, after CPD refused to produce the video of the shooting captured on 
officers’ dashboard cameras, a Chicago journalist sued for release of the video under the 
Illinois Freedom of Information Act.37 On November 24, 2015, the Cook County State’s 
Attorney, Anita Alvarez, charged Jason Van Dyke with first-degree murder.38 A few hours 
later, the City released the videotape of the shooting pursuant to the November 19 court 
order.39  
Once the City released the video, public condemnation of the officer’s actions—and 
the City’s response to the shooting—were swift. Within hours of the video’s release, 
hundreds of protesters demonstrated in downtown streets.40 Additional public protests 
flooded Chicago’s main shopping district, Michigan Avenue, on Black Friday, the largest 
shopping day of the year. Protesters marched down Michigan Avenue chanting “16 shots!”, 
blocked the entrances to stores, and stopped traffic.41 
C. Mayor Emanuel Reacts to Public Outrage 
Distrust in the City’s and CPD’s leadership to honestly and fairly address the 
McDonald shooting was high. After the release of the footage of McDonald’s death, 
community leaders and activists alleged that Mayor Emanuel had covered up the videotape 
and refused to release it in an effort to win his re-election bid.42 Protestors called for the 
 
35 Chicago Police Department Consent Decree: A Timeline of the Push for Reforms, CBS CHI. (Jul. 27, 
2018), https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2018/07/27/chicago-police-consent-decree-timeline/html; see also 
Marissa Bailey, Police Shoot, Kill Knife-Wielding Teen on South Side, CBS CHI. (Oct. 21, 2014), 
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2014/10/21/police-shoot-kill-knife-wielding-teen-on-south-side/.  
36 Bill Ruthhart, Despite Challenges, Mayor Confident About Re-election, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 11, 2017), 
http://digitaledition.chicagotribune.com/tribune/article_popover.aspx?guid=a8786e99-87f5-4d7d-afea-
e8553d04fed5.html.  
37 Compl. at 1, Smith v. Chi. Police Dep’t, 2015-CH-11780 (Ill. Cir. Ct. filed Aug. 5, 2015); Illinois 
Freedom of Information Act, 5 ILCS 140/1 et seq. (2017); Matt Ford, The Killing of Laquan McDonald, 
THE ATLANTIC (Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/11/chicago-police-
indictment/417531/.  
38 Ford, supra note 37.   
39 Kori Rumore & Chad Yoder, Minute by Minute: How Jason Van Dyke Shot Laquan McDonald, CHI. 
TRIB. (Jan. 18, 2019, https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/laquan-mcdonald/ct-jason-vandyke-laquan-
mcdonald-timeline-htmlstory.html.  
40 Alex Johnson, Protestors Block Chicago Streets Over Video of Laquan McDonald’s Killing, NBC NEWS, 
(Nov. 24, 2015), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/video-laquan-mcdonalds-killing-be-released-
chicago-braces-protests-n469171.html.  
41 Activists March on Magnificent Mile to Protest Laquan McDonald Shooting, CBS CHI. (Nov. 27, 2015), 
https://chicago.cbslocal.com/2015/11/27/protest-organizers-plan-magnificent-mile-march-over-laquan-
mcdonalds-death/.  
42  Edward McClelland, Rahm Emanuel's Nixon Moment: The Laquan McDonald Coverup Will Be His 
Legacy, SALON (Dec. 2, 2015, 3:59 PM), 
https://www.salon.com/2015/12/02/rahm_emanuels_nixon_moment/. In April 2015, Mayor Rahm Emanuel 
had won a relatively close re-election following the first mayoral runoff in more than 16 years. Julie 
Bosman, Rahm Emanuel Wins Runoff Election to Secure 2nd Term as Chicago Mayor, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 7, 




firing of Police Superintendent Garry McCarthy and for the resignation of Mayor 
Emanuel.43  
In response to the outrage caused by the videotape, Mayor Emanuel fired police 
Superintendent Garry McCarthy on December 1, 2015.44 The same day, he announced the 
creation of yet another blue-ribbon task force to review the systems of training, oversight, 
and accountability for CPD officers. This time, the panel was called the Police 
Accountability Task Force (PATF). The Mayor appointed Lori Lightfoot, the President of 
the Police Board and a partner at the large Chicago law firm Mayer Brown, to serve as one 
of several co-chairs of the Task Force. Mayor Emanuel charged the PATF with 
recommending reforms to (1) improve independent oversight of police misconduct; (2) 
ensure that officers with repeated complaints are identified and evaluated appropriately; 
and (3) establish best practices for the release of videos of police-involved incidents.45  
D. Calls for the U.S. Department of Justice to Investigate CPD 
On December 1, 2015, Lisa Madigan, as Illinois Attorney General, wrote to the 
United States Attorney General Loretta Lynch asking her, with urgency, to initiate a pattern 
or practice investigation into whether CPD had committed systemic violations of federal 
law.    
Addressing these problems and repairing [] CPD’s relationship with the 
community will require a fundamental redirection of Chicago’s approach to 
law enforcement and accountability for police abuse . . . Trust in the 
Chicago Police Department is broken, especially in communities of color in 
the City of Chicago . . . The children of Chicago deserve to grow up in a 
city in which they are safe, protected and served by a police force that is fit 
for this fine [c]ity—something that many in our community do not 
experience today.46  
Specifically, we asked DOJ to (1) investigate CPD’s use of force, including deadly 
force; (2) examine the adequacy of CPD’s review and investigation of officers’ use of force 
and investigate all allegations of misconduct; (3) evaluate CPD’s provision of training, 
 
2015), nytimes/com/2015/04/08/us/rahm-emanuel-retains-seat-as-chicagos-mayor.html. Mayor Emanuel’s 
runoff opponent, Cook County Commissioner Jesus “Chuy” Garcia, asserted that Mayor Emanuel was not 
addressing the concerns of Chicago’s working class and diverse neighborhoods. Id. 
43 Id. 
44 Id. 
45 Press Release, Mayor’s Office, (Dec. 1, 2015), Mayor Emanuel Announces Task Force on Police 
Accountability, found at 
https://www.chicago.gov/city/en/depts/mayor/press_room/press_releases/2015/december/Task-Force-
Police.html. 
46  Madigan Calls for U.S. Department of Justice Civil Rights Division to Investigate Chicago Police 
Department, NBC CHI. (Dec. 1, 2015, 4:58 PM), https://www.nbcchicago.com/blogs/ward-room/Madigan-
Calls-for-Federal-Investigation-of-Chicago-Police-Department-359718081.html; see also Mark Guarino, 
Illinois Attorney General Asks Justice Department for Civil Rights Investigation into Chicago Police, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 1, 2015, 7:22 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2015/12/01/illinois-attorney-general-asks-justice-dept-for-civil-rights-investigation-into-the-
chicago-police department/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.72047b768684.html.    
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equipment, and supervision of officers; and (4) examine whether a pattern or practice of 
discriminatory policing exists.   
Mayor Emanuel called the request for an investigation “misguided” and opposed it.47 
National political leaders joined our call in the following days.48 In addition, there was 
overwhelming public support and calls from editorial boards for an independent 
investigation.49 “Faced with a rising tide of criticism—including from then-Democratic 
presidential nominee Hillary Clinton—Emanuel had no choice but to drop his opposition 
to the probe.”50 
A week later, on December 7, 2015, DOJ announced that its Civil Rights Division 
would open a pattern or practice investigation to determine whether CPD engaged in a 
discriminatory pattern or practice of unconstitutional policing, including in the use of 
excessive force.51 We were confident that DOJ’s conclusions would lead us one step closer 
to real police reform in Chicago. At this point, we believed that DOJ and the City of 
Chicago would pursue the recommended path forward.  
E.  Reports Confirm Widespread Problems with CPD 
The PATF, which Mayor Emanuel had appointed, released its 183-page report in 
April 2016 with details and findings about a broad range of issues organized around five 
areas: video release policies, de-escalation, community and police reforms, early 
intervention and personnel concerns, and legal oversight and accountability. The PATF 
concluded that “CPD’s response to the violence [in Chicago] is not sufficiently imbued 
with Constitutional policing and tactics,” and that “CPD’s own data gives validity to the 
widely held belief [that] the police have no regard for the sanctity of life when it comes to 
people of color.”52 Both the PATF’s in-depth analysis and its extensive recommendations 
provided a damning picture of the severe impact of racism in the city and the significant 
problems at CPD.53   
 
47 Bill Ruthhart & Annie Sweeney, Emanuel Now Open to Justice Department Review of Chicago Police, 
CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-rahm-emanuel-justice-department-
chicago-police-20151203-story.html; Tony Arnold & Lauren Chooljian, Madigan Calls for Investigation of 
Chicago Police, ILL. PUB. RADIO (Dec. 2, 2015), https://www.northernpublicradio.org/post/madigan-calls-
investigation-chicago-police-0.  
48 Timothy M. Phelps et al., Feds to Conduct Civil Rights Probe of Chicago Police, CHI. TRIB. (Dec. 7, 
2015), https://www.chicagotribune.com/news/ct-chicago-police-justice-department-investigates-met-
20151206-story.html.  
49 Alexandra Silets, Newspaper Editorial Boards Weigh In on Laquan McDonald Shooting, WTTW (Nov. 
30, 2015), https://news.wttw.com/2015/11/30/newspaper-editorial-boards-weigh-laquan-mcdonald-
shooting. 
50 Heather Cherone, Chicago Police Reform Efforts Need Federal Oversight, Rahm Says, DNA INFO (Aug. 
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On January 13, 2017, DOJ confirmed the legitimacy of the decades-long call for 
reform of the CPD. At the conclusion of its year-long investigation, DOJ issued a 161-page 
report (DOJ Report) concluding that “CPD officers engage in a pattern or practice of using 
force, including deadly force, that is unreasonable,” in violation of the Fourth Amendment 
to the United States Constitution.54 DOJ’s investigation revealed that this pattern or 
practice, which disproportionately impacts African American and Latino communities in 
Chicago, “is largely attributable to systemic deficiencies within CPD and the City” in the 
training and supervision of officers, accountability systems, and the collection and 
reporting of data on officer use of force.55 In addition, DOJ determined that the lack of 
effective community-oriented policing strategies, unaddressed racially discriminatory 
conduct by officers, and insufficient support for officer wellness contributed to the pattern 
or practice of unconstitutional use of force.56 The DOJ Report concluded that these 
systemic deficiencies pervade all aspects of policing, including officer training, 
supervision, accountability mechanisms, and officer support structures, and reinforce a 
“code of silence” in which CPD officers lie and undertake affirmative efforts to conceal 
evidence of misconduct.57 The DOJ Report also found that the “impact of CPD’s pattern 
of unreasonable force fall[s] heaviest on predominately black and Latino 
neighborhoods.”58  
We were not surprised by these findings, but we knew that DOJ’s recommendations 
for real police reform would not be sustainable unless a court enforced them. To remedy 
these systemic deficiencies, the DOJ Report made ninety-nine specific recommendations 
regarding reforms in the areas of use of force, accountability, training, supervision, officer 
wellness and safety, data collection and transparency, promotions, and community 
policing.59 In making its recommendations, the DOJ Report emphasized that the required 
reforms 
will likely not happen or be sustained without the reform tools of an 
independent monitoring team and a court order … Together, an independent 
monitor and court decree will make it much more certain that Chicago is 
finally able to eliminate patterns of unconstitutional conduct, and can 
bolster community confidence to make policing in Chicago more effective 
and less dangerous.60   
When DOJ released its report, findings and recommendations, DOJ officials held a 
joint press conference with Chicago officials to announce the conclusion of their 
investigation.61 Mayor Emanuel stood with Attorney General Lynch and entered into an 
Agreement in Principle between the City and DOJ to work together to negotiate a consent 
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decree to be entered as an order in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of 
Illinois.62 The Agreement also committed to specifying the selection and appointment 
process for an independent monitor to evaluate the City’s progress under the consent 
decree.63 The signing of this Agreement was an important moment for Chicago. We were 
encouraged to see things progressing with a sense of cooperation and coordination.  
F.  City Officials Respond with Reluctance 
Following the commencement of DOJ’s investigation, the City made changes to its 
law enforcement practices. But the changes were insufficient to eliminate the decades-old 
policies, customs, and practices of unlawful conduct and to ensure they would not recur. 64   
The City put in place a new use of force policy, rolled out more body-worn cameras 
for officers, and distributed more tasers.65 The City initiated some reform efforts, including 
providing refresher training for officers on use of force policies for the first time and 
reconfiguring the police accountability arm—the Independent Police Review Authority 
(IPRA)—and thereby creating a new version of this oversight body called the Civilian 
Office of Police Accountability (COPA).66    
However, even the incremental reforms announced by the City faced steep 
opposition from the rank and file officer union, the Fraternal Order of Police (FOP). For 
example, when IPRA became COPA, the FOP opposed the changes. Union spokesman 
Martin Prieb wrote in an email: “Based on our early observations, the FOP does not believe 
our officers will be investigated fairly under COPA . . . Our collective bargaining 
agreement does not recognize the authority of COPA. Nevertheless, we have already taken 
steps to bolster the legal defense of our members and to go on the offensive.”67 
Despite the City’s incremental changes to policing, a local investigative news 
analysis in September 2017 concluded that only six of the DOJ’s ninety-nine recommended 
reforms had been fully implemented.68 In arriving at that conclusion, reporter Jonah 
Newman explained that because there was no independent monitor reporting on the City’s 
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DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND THE CITY OF CHICAGO REGARDING THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT (Jan. 
13, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/925901/download [hereinafter AGREEMENT IN PRINCIPLE 
BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE]. 
63 Id.   
64 Cherone, supra note 50 (quoting Complaint at 7, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL 398703, at *1). 
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progress, he relied on “the city’s own public statements that [] CPD has put out.”69 He 
stated, “[f]or the most part, we took the city at their word” that any of the reforms had in 
fact been implemented.70 But CPD had yet to even begin many of the far-reaching 
recommendations for reform made by DOJ and the PATF. This lack of action led to 
increasing skepticism by the public and concern that the Mayor’s attempt at actual, 
dedicated, and sustainable police reform would falter in the same ways each previous 
attempt had.     
G. High Costs of Police Misconduct and Under-Resourced Department 
Further adding to the growing pressure for police reform, the City’s defense of 
lawsuits alleging police misconduct had taken a severe financial toll on the taxpayers. 
Between 2004 and 2016 alone, the City paid approximately $662 million in settlements, 
judgments, and outside legal fees for police misconduct cases.71 Yet, only half of these 
cases have resulted in official disciplinary investigations, and fewer than four percent of 
those investigations have resulted in disciplinary recommendations.72 These payouts have 
included spectacularly large settlements in high profile cases—including over $115 million 
dollars paid out to plaintiffs due to torture and wrongful conviction suits stemming from 
the notorious Jon Burge related cases.73 However, the numbers also represent the aggregate 
of many smaller payments—on average one settlement every two days—with a median 
payout of $50,000.74 Those costs routinely exceed the budget the City has set aside for 
legal settlements, causing the City to borrow to cover the costs—costs that alternatively 
could be used to institute real reform required by a consent decree.75 The City Council 
approved issuing $100 million in bonds in 2016 and 2017 just to cover the costs of 
lawsuits.76   
In addition to the toll on the City’s taxpayers, officers were also feeling the burden 
of the problems with the City’s underinvestment in policing and police officers in Chicago. 
Between 2013 and 2015, CPD’s officer suicide rate was 29.4 per 100,000, which was sixty 
percent higher than the national average for law enforcement officers.77 
 With the torrent of bad news and taxpayer obligations, many had asked: How does 
this happen? Where is the accountability? There had been assertions for years that CPD 
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in investigations regarding allegations of misconduct by their fellow officers. Former CPD 
Superintendent Jody Weis, who had also served in the FBI, stated:  
The culture here is if you get in trouble, if there’s an administrative inquiry, 
you can lie and do whatever you can to get out of it because the penalty for 
lying will never be greater than the trouble you’re in. . .  to say [the ‘Thin 
Blue Line’] doesn’t exist, is naïve.78   
Former Superintendent Weis identified that the retaliation an officer would receive from 
other officers for crossing that “Thin Blue Line” and breaking the code of silence would 
be far greater than any discipline the officer might face from CPD or the Police Board.      
The data bore out this “Thin Blue Line” effect too. Only two percent of the 28,567 
misconduct complaints filed between March 2011 and September 2015 resulted in actual 
discipline.79 The results for officer-involved shootings were even worse: of the 409 officer-
involved shootings between October 2007 and September 2015, only two (0.49%) were 
found to be unjustified shootings.80   
Mayor Emanuel, following the release of the video of the shooting of Laquan 
McDonald, stated in a speech before the City Council, “This problem is sometimes referred 
to as the Thin Blue Line. Other times it is referred to as the code of silence. It is the tendency 
to ignore, deny or in some cases cover-up the bad actions of a colleague or colleagues.”81 
Though Mayor Emanuel himself publicly acknowledged the existence of a code of 
silence,82 his hand-selected Police Superintendent, Eddie Johnson, refused to acknowledge 
the code of silence in the wake of the investigation and outcry of the Laquan McDonald 
shooting. In March 2018, Superintendent Johnson was asked about the Mayor’s remarks 
and his own observations of the code of silence in a deposition. He denied that he had ever 
seen or witnessed a code of silence in the Chicago Police Department.83 He said: “I’ve 
been a cop now for about 30 years. I’ve never heard police officers talking about, in my 
experience, code of silence . . . Again, in my personal experience, I’m not sure what code 
of silence means.”84  
H. DOJ Makes an About Face 
On January 20, 2017, Donald Trump was sworn in as President of the United States, 
and the federal government’s concern about decades of police misconduct changed. The 
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President nominated the U.S. Senator from Alabama, Jeff Sessions, to serve as United 
States Attorney General. Almost immediately, DOJ took a contradictory position than it 
had only weeks earlier when it released its report about CPD. Typically, after issuing a 
report and recommendations, DOJ negotiates a consent decree with an independent 
monitor to cover all of the changes that the preceding investigation determined that a police 
department needed for reform. However, Attorney General Sessions made a clear shift in 
DOJ’s approach and pronounced that “protect[ing] and respect[ing] the civil rights of all 
members of the public” and “implement[ing] best practices in policing” are “first and 
foremost, tasks for state, local, and tribal law enforcement.”85 Sessions’ view was that 
police misconduct is not systemic or structural but is limited to a few bad cops.86 Attorney 
General Sessions and President Trump also frequently used Chicago as a punching bag. 
Sessions said, “the rule of law has broken down,” pointing to Chicago’s immigrant-friendly 
policies known as sanctuary policies as “one sad example of that.”87 
The Trump administration had sought to delay a consent decree approval process in 
Baltimore.88 There, DOJ had finalized a consent decree in the last days of the Obama 
administration and had filed it in the federal district court for its approval. However, after 
the change in administration, the Sessions’ DOJ sought a delay in the court’s review of the 
agreement. Sessions said, “I have grave concerns that some provisions of this decree will 
reduce the lawful powers of the police department and result in a less safe city.”89 While 
the court approved the Baltimore consent decree despite DOJ’s request for a delay, the 
effect the new Sessions’ DOJ would have on Chicago police reform was less clear. Sessions 
also opposed the appointment of an independent monitor to evaluate and support the 
progress of a municipality’s reform efforts. Despite Mayor Emanuel’s Agreement in 
Principle with DOJ,90 both a court-enforced consent decree and an independent monitor to 
oversee the reforms were now in jeopardy for Chicago.  
We faced a tough situation. We knew Chicago needed a consent decree and an 
independent monitor to achieve real reform. Could we go it alone without DOJ? Was there 
a path forward?   
II.  FILLING THE ROLE OF DOJ 
As Attorney General Sessions announced that policing reform was a matter to be 
dealt with at the state and local levels, the City was faced with a wide-ranging and damning 
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DOJ report, an inflammatory report from the PATF, a clamor over the history of police 
brutality in the city, community outrage over the Laquan McDonald video, and a new 
Superintendent but no firm roadmap for reform.       
A. The City Needed a Federal Court Order to Ensure Reform Was Carried Out 
Within the Illinois Attorney General’s Office, we knew a consent decree was 
essential to ensuring real, sustainable, and lasting reform. We were unwilling to accept 
anything less. Though we recognized that police reform is always a difficult road, 
especially with the high number of recommended changes, we also understood that the 
only way for it to be sustainable, lasting reform would be for entry of a consent decree 
overseen by a federal judge and an independent monitor to assess and support that progress.   
A consent decree would need to cover several substantive areas of reform to address 
the complex, deeply entrenched deficiencies at CPD, including departmental policies and 
practices, such as use of force and bias-based policing, training, supervision and 
accountability systems, officer wellness programs, and community engagement.91 
In addition, a consent decree would require an independent, third-party monitor to 
submit reports to the court—not only to the parties—and to make the reports available to 
the public. A consent decree would require public access to status hearings regarding the 
progress of the consent decree. The hearings would provide an effective forum to discuss 
and resolve implementation challenges and disagreements between the parties. In the event 
the parties could not resolve a material disagreement, the court would possess jurisdiction 
to resolve the dispute. Finally, in the event the City failed to comply with a consent decree, 
the court could oversee contempt proceedings.  
To the surprise of many, in June 2017, the City revealed it was in the process of 
negotiating an Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) with DOJ to address police reform. 
The City announced that it had reached an “agreement in principle” with the Trump 
Administration’s DOJ—the same administration that proudly declared its disbelief in the 
need for police reform. DOJ responded that it had not agreed on any format for Chicago 
police reform and was reviewing a proposal from the Chicago Mayor’s office.92 The City 
acknowledged that its proposal did not include federal court oversight of reforms.93  Lack 
of court oversight was a reversal of the City’s position from a few months earlier, when 
the Mayor had agreed with the Obama DOJ that it would negotiate a consent decree.94 
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Our concern was the lack of accountability and the watered-down version of reform 
that would result with the MOA that the City had proposed with DOJ.95 In contrast to the 
robust mechanisms for accountability in a consent decree, such as an independent monitor 
who would report to the court on progress under the consent decree or a party’s ability to 
file a motion with the court to enforce the consent decree should the City breach its 
obligations, an MOA only affords the remedy of a breach of contract action. Such a remedy 
is less expedient and less transparent.    
Without federal judicial oversight, the City’s and DOJ’s MOA would have left 
Chicago with too much leeway to pursue less than comprehensive, lasting reform of all 
critical aspects of CPD’s use of force, as well as officer training, supervision, 
accountability, and wellness. It was clear to us and most Chicagoans that police reform 
without independent oversight and accountability would fail, as it had in the past. As the 
Obama DOJ noted in its Report, “[t]ogether, an independent monitor and court decree will 
make it much more certain that Chicago is finally able to eliminate patterns of 
unconstitutional conduct, and can bolster community confidence to make policing in 
Chicago more effective and less dangerous.”96  
B. We Oppose the City’s Effort to Pursue Anything Less Than a Consent Decree 
The City’s attempt to end-run around its previous commitment to a police reform 
consent decree by proposing an MOA with DOJ was met with widespread criticism. We 
called the City’s negotiation with a DOJ that does not believe in the need for constitutional 
policing “ludicrous.”97 We called on Mayor Emanuel to “stop wasting time” and to commit 
to a transparent process that would result in a consent decree.98 The Mayor refused to 
respond to our call for a consent decree, instead suggesting that the format of the agreement 
was not important and that an MOA with DOJ would produce the same results as a court-
ordered consent decree.99 We suggested that a lawsuit to seek a consent decree was a 
possibility, but called it a “last option.”100 
Our call for a consent decree set off a series of discussions over several months with 
Mayor Emanuel, the City Corporation Counsel, CPD, and our office.101 We continued to 
call for a consent decree, and a growing chorus of the City’s civic leaders, religious leaders, 
elected officials, community activists, and civil rights leaders  added their objections to the 
City’s inadequate plan to pursue reforms through an MOA with DOJ.    
Prominent newspaper editorial boards entered the conversation as well. The Editorial 
Board of the Chicago Sun-Times wrote: 
We urge the mayor to join with Madigan and others in negotiating a 
practical and rigorously scheduled federal consent decree, which would 
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mean court oversight . . . When Madigan’s office, civil liberties groups, 
influential community organizations and editorial boards line up to warn 
that anything short of a formal consent decree might not earn the public’s 
trust, it’s good to listen.102  
The Editorial Board of the New York Times urged the Mayor to act too.103 In 
agreeing with Attorney General Madigan’s claim that “[t]here has never been systemic and 
comprehensive police reform in Chicago because there has never been an enforceable court 
order requiring it,” the Times Editorial Board said, “Mayor Emanuel should take those 
words to heart and act.”104 
Activists and community members who had been organizing around police reform 
and community oversight of CPD did not believe that the City could reform itself. Many 
were concerned by reports of the City’s proposal of an MOA with DOJ and troubled that 
it would produce a watered-down version of reform. Taking matters into their own hands, 
individual plaintiffs as well as a coalition of community organizations led by Black Lives 
Matter Chicago, Blocks Together, Brighton Park Neighborhood Association, Chicago 
Urban League, Justice For Families, NAACP Westside Branch, Network 49, Women’s All 
Points Bulletin, and 411 Movement for Pierre Loury filed a civil rights lawsuit (the 
Campbell lawsuit) on June 14, 2017.105 The coalition’s litigation sought a consent decree 
and accused the City of trying to cut a “back-room deal” with Attorney General 
Sessions.106  
The City fought the Campbell lawsuit and refused to engage in discussions about a 
consent decree with the Campbell plaintiffs.107 While the City did not immediately respond 
directly to the lawsuit after it was filed, the City proclaimed its commitment to reform and 
pointed to its own plans to pursue reform.108 In its legal filing, the City moved to dismiss 
the lawsuit brought by the civil rights groups, asserting that a consent decree is not 
necessary because the practices that gave rise to the DOJ investigation “are no longer in 
place in light of CPD’s extensive, ongoing reform efforts.”109 In addition, the City 
challenged the standing of the plaintiffs.110 
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Yet, activists and community leaders remained unconvinced based on their prior 
experiences with police reform efforts in the city. Mecole Jordan, a lead organizer with 
United Congress and the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability (GAPA), explained 
community skepticism in the City’s ability to reform itself: 
We’ve been hearing Mayor Emanuel and Supt. Eddie Johnson say, ‘Trust 
me, trust us,’ . . . But the residents that we work with every single day did 
trust the city leaders.  They trusted them to serve and protect.  They trusted 
them to tell the truth.  They trusted them not to violate their civil rights. But 
that trust is now severely broken.111 
Despite the overwhelming calls for a consent decree to govern Chicago police 
reform, the Mayor remained staunchly opposed.112 He dismissed the skepticism about the 
City’s ability and willingness to reform without a consent decree: “[W]e are actually in the 
middle of making all the changes without a court order, and continue to do it; and we will 
do it.”113 He stuck to this message—that change was already occurring—and he didn’t need 
any more assistance. We rejected that notion and forged ahead.   
The City contended that it had spent months negotiating an MOA, which the Mayor 
asserted would suffice to ensure meaningful changes.114 Mayor Emanuel’s floor leader in 
the City Council, Alderman Pat O’Connor, expressed concerns about the role of a federal 
judge in police reform: “If we do what those reports recommend, what role would the judge 
play—other than adding another layer of bureaucracy and encumbering the city with 
millions and millions of dollars in more reporting, more monitoring?”115 
In response to calls for transparency, the City refused to publicly release its draft 
MOA with DOJ.116 Instead, the City allowed a few key stakeholders to review the draft 
privately. One of those stakeholders, then-Police Board President and PATF Co-Chair Lori 
Lightfoot, stated that the draft had “no specific list of reforms that must be achieved; no 
deadline that must be met; no commitment of personnel and funding and no commitment 
to change [the] police contract.”117 Our office also reviewed the draft and found that it fell 
short of the commitment needed to reform CPD.  
  Skeptical of this potential watered-down agreement with DOJ, Christy Lopez, one 
of the leaders of DOJ’s CPD investigation, spoke out in favor of a consent decree: “I’ve 
 
111 Chi. Tribune Staff, Morning Spin: Rauner Won’t Sign 911 Funding Plan that Could Increase Phone 
Taxes, CHI. TRIB. (June 23, 2017), https://www.chicagotribune.com/politics/ct-bruce-rauner-phone-fees-
20170623-story.html. 
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reform-suit-filed-by-attorney-general-madigan.html. 
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2017), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2017/6/14/18332691/mayor-rahm-emanuel-at-a-crossroads-on-police-
reform.html. 
116 Spielman, supra note 101.  
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never seen a department that screams out for a consent decree more than Chicago. To let 
this opportunity pass with this fig leaf of an agreement is really pretty tragic for the people 
of Chicago.”118 
With no other framework in place to secure necessary reforms, we were left with no 
other choice. We sued the City of Chicago in federal court.  
C.  We Sue the City of Chicago in Pursuit of a Police Reform Consent Decree 
 After a summer of the City dragging its feet on real and lasting reform and refusing 
to discuss a consent decree framework with the community groups that filed suit, we 
informed the City of our intentions to bring a lawsuit and seek a consent decree overseen 
by a federal judge. After weeks of discussions we “agreed that meaningful and sustainable 
reform requires an enforceable consent decree.”119 As the New York Times Editorial Board 
observed, “[t]he city had little choice but to embrace the lawsuit.”120 The case was filed on 
August 29, 2017. As we said when we filed, “[w]e are stepping into the shoes of the 
Department of Justice, which abandoned this effort . . . It is clear that the Trump 
administration’s view of policing is not consistent with our own. [Our] office will take the 
lead.”121  
At the same time that we filed the lawsuit against the City, Mayor Emanuel and CPD 
Superintendent Johnson committed to work with us to negotiate an enforceable consent 
decree. While Mayor Emanuel agreed to enter into consent decree negotiations with us, he 
reluctantly reversed his position on whether the City needed federal oversight.122 Mayor 
Emanuel and Superintendent Johnson asked to participate in the press conference when the 
suit was announced, and we agreed. At the press conference, Superintendent Johnson said 
“I don’t think this is a blow [to the City].”123 In our lawsuit, we conveyed our mission to 
deliver for Chicagoans a police department that respects their constitutional rights, protects 
their safety, and supports the officers who take on these vital responsibilities.   
 
D.  With No Statute that Explicitly Provides Authority, We Use Our Parens Patrie 
Powers to Pursue Fourth Amendment and State Civil Rights Claims 
Our Complaint, based on the findings and recommendations of the DOJ and PATF 
reports, sought injunctive relief for alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. 
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Constitution,124 Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution,125 the Illinois Civil Rights 
Act of 2003,126 and the Illinois Human Rights Act.127  
In particular, the Complaint contained four counts. Importantly, the Complaint 
contained a single federal count that alleged the City and its agents maintain a policy, 
custom, or practice of using force against persons in Chicago without lawful justification, 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.128 
We also made the same claim under Article I, Section 6 of the Illinois Constitution, which, 
similar to the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, prohibits unreasonable search 
and seizure.129 In addition, our Complaint alleged claims under the Illinois Civil Rights Act 
of 2003, asserting that the City’s law enforcement practices have a disproportionate impact 
on African Americans and Latinos.130 Finally, we asserted a claim under the Illinois Human 
Rights Act, alleging a pattern or practice of discrimination that denies African Americans 
and Latinos in Chicago the full and equal enjoyment of the privileges of the City’s law 
enforcement services.131    
Our lawsuit seeking police reform in the City of Chicago was unprecedented in more 
ways than one. CPD would become the largest police department to ever face a police 
consent decree.132 The scope of the decree was also unparalleled, covering the broad and 
deep problems identified by DOJ and systemic deficiencies in nearly every area of CPD 
operations. Moreover, the decision to file a lawsuit first, rather than at the conclusion of 
successful negotiations, was much more aggressive than the DOJ’s typical approach. DOJ 
rarely files suits against police departments engaged in federal consent decree negotiations.  
In addition, the fact that a state attorney general was leading the sought-after police 
reform, rather than DOJ, was incredibly rare, but well within our jurisdiction. DOJ pursues 
police reform under the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 42 
U.S.C. § 14141.133 The statute gives DOJ the authority to pursue equitable and declarative 
relief to eliminate a pattern or practice of unconstitutional or unlawful conduct in a civil 
 
124 U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
125 ILL. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 6.  
126 740 ILCS 23/5(b).  
127 775 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-102(C) (West 2020). 
128 Complaint at ¶¶ 205-208, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL 398703, at *1, ECF No. 1; U.S. CONST. 
amend. IV; 42 U.S.C. §1983.  
129 Complaint at ¶¶ 209-212, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL 398703, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2017), 
ECF No. 1; ILL. CONST. Art. I, Sec. 6. 
130 Complaint at ¶¶ 213-216, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL 398703, at *1, ECF No. 1; 740 ILCS 
23/5(b). 
131 Complaint at ¶¶ 217-218, Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL 398703, at *1, ECF No. 1; 775 ILCS 
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action.134 Outside of the authority provided under federal law, almost no states have 
statutes that provide similar authority. While California law allows the state attorney 
general to pursue consent decree-type reform under an explicit statute, the state attorneys 
general have exercised that power sparingly.135 Unlike DOJ and California, Illinois does 
not have a statute granting its state attorney general explicit authority to address police 
reform in a manner that resembles 42 U.S.C. § 14141.  
A consent decree for Chicago was the only thing that would address the serious need 
for reforms, unmet by DOJ. While private plaintiffs had lodged suits against the City for 
years, the United States Supreme Court’s decision in City of Los Angeles v. Lyons limited 
the viability of the injunctive relief sought in those suits.136 In Lyons, the plaintiff suffered 
an unconstitutional chokehold in an encounter with an officer of the Los Angeles Police 
Department.137 The Court held that Lyons could not seek an injunction barring the use of 
the chokehold unless he could show that he was likely to suffer future injury from police 
officers’ use of the chokehold.138 This decision has significantly limited private plaintiffs’ 
abilities to seek systemic reform in law enforcement cases.   
Unfortunately, individual damages cases have proven to be ineffective at achieving 
police reform. For example, in Detroit, before DOJ settled its pattern or practice case there 
in 2003, Detroit had paid out over $100 million a year in police-related misconduct 
damages between 1986 and 1997.139 Despite significant payouts such as these, damages 
claims alone had, in many cities, been inadequate to generate deep, lasting reform.  
What has been shown to work at achieving lasting police reform are consent decrees 
overseen by a government entity.140 Although the empirical evidence is not comprehensive, 
studies of consent decrees in other cities have shown that they are effective and 
sustainable.141 In one study, completed by the Vera Institute of Justice, the authors 
evaluated the impact of the Pittsburgh consent decree years after the city was no longer 
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overseen by a monitor.142 The study concluded that the reforms implemented in the consent 
decree remained in effect even after the decree was lifted, suggesting the reforms were 
effective.143 In Los Angeles, after implementation of its consent decree, the number of 
arrests increased, crime fell substantially, and the use of force decreased.144 The 
community’s satisfaction with the department overall increased, although there were 
material differences based on the race of the respondent.145   
While we did not have an explicit statute to address police reform akin to § 14141, 
the Illinois Attorney General’s Office had been part of a trend among state attorneys 
general increasingly enforcing federal and state civil rights laws.146 Once Attorney General 
Sessions was sworn in, it became even more imperative that state attorneys general act in 
the absence of reform efforts at the federal level because it was clear that DOJ would no 
longer act to protect civil rights, including in the area of police reform.    
III. NEGOTIATING A CONSENT DECREE   
A.  Illinois Attorney General’s Office Conducts a Supplemental Investigation 
In order to accomplish the enormous reform work ahead, we dedicated a team of 
attorneys to conduct the factual investigation, prepared drafts of consent decree provisions, 
participate in negotiations, and review and incorporate feedback from various stakeholders 
into the consent decree.147 Attorneys from the law firm Robins Kaplan LLP also assisted 
our office pro bono.   
We hired a team of experts with extensive experience in the investigation and 
oversight of large city police forces.148 Our experts included Ronald Davis, who previously 
served as Executive Director of President Obama’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing149 
and served as the Director of DOJ’s Office of Community Oriented Policing Services 
(COPS Office); Kathleen O’Toole, who previously served as the Chief of the Seattle Police 
Department while that Department was under a federal consent decree with the Department 
of Justice; Scott Thomson, the then-current Chief of the Police Department in Camden; 
New Jersey and the President of the Police Executive Research Forum, a national 
organization of police executives; and Jonathan Smith, who previously served as Chief of 
the Special Litigation Section of DOJ’s Civil Rights Division from 2010 to 2015, during 
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which time he was responsible for eighteen pattern or practice investigations of civil rights 
violations by law enforcement.150 
After filing suit, we undertook a discovery process that included wide-ranging and 
detailed factual investigations to further inform our understanding of CPD’s former and 
current practices.151 Specifically, we propounded 242 document requests and reviewed 
over 10,000 documents totaling over 97,000 pages.152 Further, in order to inform the 
parties’ negotiations, we conducted interviews of officers throughout the ranks of CPD, 
including commanding officers of CPD’s in-service and recruit training programs, the 
commanding officer of CPD’s Force Review Unit, Training Academy staff, and field 
training officers.153  
During our investigation, we also observed the department-wide use of force training 
provided to current CPD officers, train-the-trainer sessions, and numerous courses 
provided to new recruits at CPD’s Training Academy.154 In addition, we participated in 
ride-alongs in neighborhoods throughout the city, met with officers, sergeants, and watch 
commanders in various CPD districts, conducted site visits, and attended several detailed 
presentations provided by CPD and the City regarding ongoing and planned reform efforts 
intended to address use of force, officer training, accountability, promotions, crisis 
intervention, officer wellness, data management, community policing, and impartial 
policing. 155 
B.  Community Feedback is Paramount 
We knew that all our efforts would be in vain if we did not make community 
engagement and feedback the central focus of our process. We built our work off of the 
tireless dedication of community activists, leaders, and organizations in Chicago that had 
long engaged in police reform efforts.156 Many activists had laid the foundational analysis 
and outcry around the systemic problems with Chicago police for years, and it reached a 
fever pitch after the Laquan McDonald shooting.157   
 
150 Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Support of Approval of the Proposed Consent Decree, State of Illinois v. 
City of Chicago, No. 17-cv-6260 at 6. 





156 Notably, the community members engaged in discussions and protests were not just the practiced and 
tenured community leaders who had been protesting police violence for decades, such as Jesse Jackson and 
Rainbow Push Coalition, but it also included many young, grassroots activists who had been fighting the 
broken system of policing and Chicago’s failed response to it, such as Assata’s Daughters and a coalition of 
people organizing for justice for Rekia Boyd, a young woman killed by an off-duty cop who had 
discharged his weapon.   
157 In addition, because within days of the court ordered release of the video of Chicago police officer Jason 
Van Dyke killing Laquan McDonald, the Mayor had commissioned PATF, and then DOJ came in to town 
to start its investigation in December 2015, many community groups and community members had been 
engaged in police reform discussions for many months. In large part because of this built in structure and 
conversation around police reform, many community groups and leaders had covered tremendous ground 
through PATF, DOJ investigation, as well as the Grassroots Alliance for Police Accountability, a collective 
made up of several community organizations that proposed an ordinance for community oversight of the 
police department. 




While our approach to negotiating the consent decree in many ways mirrored DOJ’s 
process, we prioritized the community’s voice in unique and notable ways that DOJ had 
never undertaken. This collaborative approach made our process stand out from other 
efforts, and it represented our office’s unyielding commitment to those most impacted by 
police violence.158 Because we live here and know the strong community voices that for 
too long have been ignored by traditional leadership structures, we recognized that the 
complete lack of trust between the community and police was a major challenge and 
restoring that trust a top priority. While asserting the critical need for the City to build that 
trust, the consent decree had to be a tool for building that trust and could not serve as yet 
another obstacle toward achieving it. Community engagement was key. 
C.  We Organize Roundtables Across the City to Gather Community Input   
One way we worked to engage the community was through more than a dozen 
organized, public roundtables held across Chicago. As we set out to hear from the 
community members most impacted by police practices, we worked closely to organize 
each meeting as an opportunity for all community members to share their stories and 
experiences in interacting with CPD as well as to hear their input on what police reforms 
were necessary. The Institute for Policy and Civic Engagement at the University of Illinois 
at Chicago facilitated the sessions and worked with our office to design the sessions and 
their format.159  
At each roundtable, the community members in attendance were broken up into 
round tables, where facilitators asked specific questions on three topics: impartial policing, 
community policing, and use of force. The facilitator wrote down the ideas and suggestions 
made at the table. Notetakers carefully transcribed and reviewed the responses by 
community members to ensure they were accurately recorded.160 Eventually, all the 
smaller groups came back together, and facilitators or community members reported their 
ideas out to the larger group at the end of each event. In total, we hosted fourteen 
roundtables throughout the city centered in some of the communities most impacted by 
police misconduct and partnered with community organizations who co-hosted the 
discussions in their communities and helped to spread the word to community members.161 
Through the roundtable process, we received more than 6,000 comments on the 
proposed consent decree from more than 1,000 participants.162 In addition, we collected 
approximately 1,600 additional comments through website submissions, emails, and voice 
messages.163 We shared all of the community ideas with the city. 
Further, we conducted small-group conversations to ensure feedback from diverse 
communities, including youth, the LGBTQ+ community, survivors of domestic violence 
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and sexual assault, people experiencing homelessness, violence interrupters, and the deaf 
and hard-of-hearing community.164 
The University of Illinois at Chicago compiled and published a report with the 
community feedback.  The report also contained each of the 6,000 comments verbatim for 
community review.165 Their inclusion was important to provide transparency to the 
community—both to ensure community members that their comments were recorded, and 
to allow them to compare them to the draft consent decree.  
 A thorough review of the comments and suggestions was critical to informing our 
approach to the consent decree. The feedback included comments such as the following: 
“There must be negative consequences for bad behavior, just like how we 
raise kids. No suspensions; fire them, lock them up for violence, just like 
us.”166  
“Local police woman goes to play ball with kids on off hours to get to know 
her.  Kids know she’s police, they respect her because she care[s] about 
them. Avenue for open communication, in case something happens and 
needs to share that.”167   
“Police don’t see communities of color as humans/ like people/ residents – 
P.O.’s tend to dehumanize the people in comm[unity].”168  
“Common to those concerns [called for by community members] was the 
perception among residents that the majority of police on the West Side 
simply do not know the residents they’re supposed to be protecting.”169  
“Community members called for better training, more effective screening 
of police applicants, more effective performance reviews, enhanced cultural 
awareness and more accountability for police officers involved in shootings 
and racial profiling incidents.”170 
“Develop supports that help address stress/triggers.”171  
Some suggestions included better training of police officers; not assigning inexperienced 
officers at night when crime is highest; eliminating lack of trust through immediate 
termination of cops who kill unarmed people; termination of officers involved in a cover-
up; development of police partnerships with ex-offenders; payment of police brutality 
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settlements out of police pension fund; holding the sergeant accountable if a rookie cop 
‘messes up’; and changing the shoot-to-kill training to preserving life.172 
We brought critical community input with us into the negotiations with the City and 
CPD. As a result, we introduced points into the consent decree that were novel and not 
included in past DOJ consent decrees. For example, we included provisions that 
specifically forbid the practice of “dumping” community members (usually teenagers) by 
police officers—a practice by which CPD officers would pick up a witness from one gang 
and drop them off in rival gang territory in an effort to coerce the witnesses into speaking 
to the police. Other components included access to counsel within a reasonable period of 
time once detained, much-needed training and selection for school resource officers, 
language access, transparency and timelines regarding individual police complaints, and 
more community and youth representation in community councils. 
D.  We Propose a Unique Agreement to Provide Community Groups with a Role in the 
Consent Decree 
In addition to the Campbell lawsuit, on October 4, 2017, the ACLU of Illinois and 
Equip for Equality filed a lawsuit against the City on behalf of several community groups 
and service organizations, including ACLU of Illinois, Communities United, Community 
Renewal Society, Next Steps for Reform, and One Northside.173 The suit focused on 
patterns of misconduct impacting people with disabilities, particularly mental illnesses or 
developmental disabilities. One of the plaintiffs’ representatives explained why they felt 
the need for a lawsuit: “[CPD does] have a history of making promises and not fulfilling 
them, and so with a lawsuit, that gives you the judicial enforcement that you wouldn’t have 
otherwise.”174 Citing that an estimated one-third to one-half of the people killed by police 
in America have a disability, the group filed suit to address what their Plaintiffs 
experienced—excessive and unnecessary force in policing. The ACLU complaint 
challenged the City’s policing practices that they alleged authorized Chicago police 
officers to use excessive force, to use unlawful force on black and Latino people, and to 
use unnecessary force on individuals with disabilities and those in crisis.175   
The ACLU’s suit, along with the Campbell plaintiffs’ suit, confirmed what many 
already knew—that many facets of the Chicago community were deeply invested in the 
need to implement broad reforms in Department. The City fought to dismiss both 
community lawsuits, arguing among other reasons that the Campbell and Community 
United plaintiffs lacked standing.   
Given the legal positions the City continued to take in fighting the community 
lawsuits, and the need for community members to participate in the police reform effort, 
we attempted to find a position of compromise. In an innovative, first of its kind  
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agreement, we proposed a Coalition Memorandum of Agreement (Coalition MOA) 
between our office, the City, and a Coalition of community members led by the Campbell 
plaintiffs and Communities United plaintiffs.176 The Coalition MOA ensured that the 
community had an active voice and provided input into the substantive areas of the consent 
decree while it was being drafted.177 The Coalition MOA required that the two plaintiffs 
groups work together as a Coalition.178 In addition, the Coalition MOA gave the impacted 
community—including people of color and people with disabilities in Chicago—an 
unprecedented ability to enforce the consent decree in the future.179 Though we had been 
leading the discussion to incorporate the Communities United and the Campbell Plaintiffs 
into the consent decree since the fall of 2017, it took until March 2018 to reach the final 
Coalition MOA. The MOA also anticipated that the consent decree would be filed by 
September 1, 2018 and approved by the Court by January 1, 2019.180  
“This agreement allows community groups to act as watchdogs during the long-term 
reform process,” said Kathy Hunt Muse, one of the lawyers for the ACLU of Illinois.181 
As part of the MOA, the Campbell and Communities United groups agreed not to file 
motions to intervene or motions to consolidate their lawsuits with our litigation and agreed 
to stay their suits, hoping to settle them.182 
Community groups celebrated the MOA as a major step forward in their efforts to 
gain oversight over CPD. Counsel for Black Lives Matter explained: “The Agreement 
resulted from Black and Brown communities’ demands for justice. These communities 
have secured the right to enforce the CPD consent decree and as a result, the consent decree 
process now has the potential to help create meaningful community-based accountability 
over CPD.”183 One of the plaintiffs, the aunt of a 16-year-old teenager killed by the police, 
reacted that “after years of struggle, I finally have some hope that if the City and State 
follow the Agreement, we can prevent CPD from murdering another mother’s child.”184 
Never before had a police consent decree created a mechanism for ongoing community 
enforcement. The MOA gave communities the ability to enforce the decree and bring 
motions to enforce in court against the City for breaches of the decree, while also providing 
for ongoing quarterly discussions with the community groups and the independent 
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monitor.185 The community groups that were party to the MOA called it “historic and 
significant.”186  
E.  We Conduct Focus Groups with Police Officers and Solicit Their Feedback 
Another critical voice was law enforcement. Although the process involved sticking 
points, we found that officers voiced their interest for many important reforms. We worked 
with the Police Foundation, a national non-profit organization that conducts research and 
provides technical assistance to police departments across the country. The Police 
Foundation facilitated a series of focus groups among Chicago Police Department officers 
in thirteen groups, eleven of which were randomly selected and facilitated by retired police 
chiefs. The officers were asked to identify their greatest challenges in doing their jobs, and 
to identify what the consent decree could do to address those challenges, enhance officer 
safety, and enhance service to the community. The Police Foundation also established and 
hosted a password-protected online comment portal that was available to all CPD officers. 
The Police Foundation prepared a report that provided the parties and the public with the 
results of their meetings and outreach with CPD members.187   
The officers identified a lack of support from supervisors and command staff, elected 
officials, and the public as the most commonly voiced concern.188 Officers also identified 
the fear of negative repercussions and accountability measures, along with infrequent, 
outdated, and reactionary training as additional problems.189 They suggested provisions for 
inclusion in the consent decree addressing increased support for officers, mandatory 
training, and improved accountability mechanisms. They expressed that the addition of 
these reforms in the consent decree could improve those problems.190 Officers identified 
the critical need for more mental health counselors to support CPD members and their 
families, CPD’s need to reduce the ratio of supervisors to rank and file officers, and to 
establish a 1:1 ratio of Field Training Officers (FTO) to new officers (known as 
probationary police officers or PPOs) that are still in training.   
In addition, many officers highlighted the critical need for more mental health 
counselors to support CPD members and their families.191 CPD officers have stressful jobs 
that require that they place themselves in danger, and concerns about the lack of adequate 
mental health resources for CPD officers had also been well documented in the DOJ 
Report.192 Adequately addressing the mental health needs of officers is a particular need at 
the CPD, where the officer suicide rate is 60% higher than the national law enforcement 
average.193 Yet, in spite of this need, the DOJ Report found that the counselors and mental 
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health resources at CPD was considerably less than other comparable departments and 
“insufficient” to address the needs of its officers, with only three clinicians on staff.194  
F. Unique Challenges Hold Up the Negotiations: The FOP’s Resistance and Concerns of 
De-policing 
From the beginning, the bargaining unit representing CPD’s patrol officers, the FOP, 
presented a significant challenge to reform. While the investigation and recommendations 
from DOJ, PATF, and our own investigation highlighted the need to increase resources for 
CPD, the potential service and training, personnel, equipment, mental health and wellness 
improvements for the rank and file officers did not outweigh the FOP’s perceived threat of 
losing provisions in their collective bargaining agreement that made accountability for 
police misconduct nearly impossible in Chicago.195  
The terms and conditions of employment of CPD’s patrol officers are set out in its 
collective bargaining agreement (CBA), a contract negotiated every few years between the 
City and the FOP. As of the time of this writing, the most recent collective bargaining 
agreement with the FOP had expired on June 30, 2017, but by its terms remains in effect 
until a successor agreement is reached.196 Throughout the course of the consent decree 
negotiations, the City and the FOP were in ongoing discussions regarding the terms of the 
next CBA.  
Whether and how the terms of the CBA and the consent decree would intersect was 
a central issue in the development and approval of the consent decree. DOJ and PATF 
identified several provisions of the CBA that were obstacles to reform, and community 
groups demanded that a number of CBA provisions be changed.197 For example, the CBA 
requires that a person complete an affidavit in support of a complaint against an officer 
before that complaint would be investigated, and it forbade anonymous complaints.198 In 
the past five to ten years, an estimated forty to sixty percent of misconduct investigations 
had been closed because no affidavit was in the record.199 The CBA prohibited CPD from 
disciplining an officer for violating the rule against making false statements unless the 
officer first had an opportunity to review and amend the statement.200 The CBA requires 
the destruction of police personnel records, including disciplinary files, after five years.201 
The FOP viewed its chief role as protecting all of the provisions of its existing agreement 
and opposing any effort that threatened those measures.   
While we held several in-person meetings with the leadership of the FOP to discuss 
officers’ needs and the issues in the consent decree, the FOP relentlessly criticized the 
consent decree in strident terms. Calling our lawsuit “appalling,” the FOP told its members 
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that “something is rotten in this whole plan, and it could seriously threaten our collective 
bargaining rights . . . If elected officials in Chicago and the state of Illinois are going to 
play politics with police departments, they are playing a dangerous game.”202 
Nonetheless, our office, the FOP, and the City engaged in talks for many months. 
Those discussions included not only provisions of the consent decree that would 
acknowledge the CBA interests of the FOP, but also training, supervision and promotions, 
mental health support services for officers, and police oversight.203  
After negotiation with the FOP, the parties included “carve-out” language in the 
consent decree that recognized the existing contractual rights of the union under Illinois 
law. Those provisions of the consent decree provide, among other things, that “[n]othing 
in this Consent Decree is intended to (a) alter any of the CBAs between the City and the 
Unions; or (b) impair or conflict with the collective bargaining rights of employees in those 
units under the [Illinois Public Labor Relations Act, 5 ILCS 315].”204 Every DOJ police 
consent decree has contained similar “carve-out” provisions to address the legal or 
contractual rights of any impacted union members.   
Further, the parties offered the FOP the same terms of input and enforcement of the 
consent decree as had been offered to the community groups, and they sought to enter into 
a second MOA with the FOP. However, the FOP declined.205     
But the FOP was outraged by the announcement that our office had reached an MOA 
with community groups. FOP President Kevin Graham responded to the announcement by 
saying, “the City of Chicago should be careful where they go with a consent decree. 
Without the support of the rank and file Chicago Police Officers, their move today will go 
nowhere. Anyone who thinks it will is sadly mistaken.”206 Second City Cop, a blog for 
Chicago police officers, described the MOA as a vehicle to “give terrorists a seat at the 
table.”207 
On June 6, 2018 after rejecting the offer for the MOA, the FOP filed a motion to 
intervene in the state lawsuit.208 The FOP stated that its decision to move to intervene in a 
lawsuit that had been pending nearly a year was triggered by the community comments 
made at the time the MOA was announced.209 The FOP also alleged that it did not know 
that it needed to intervene until it “received information from confidential sources” that its 
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collective bargaining rights were in jeopardy.210 FOP’s legal objection to the consent 
decree centered on its argument that the decree impairs its existing CBA with the City.211   
The FOP, however, did not view the “carve-out” provisions in the decree as 
sufficient. In early July 2018, it filed a further motion seeking to hold the proceedings in 
abeyance pending a ruling on its motion to intervene.212 
G. Police Mistrust and Violence Persists 
In addition to the negotiations with the coalition of community groups and the FOP, 
the drumbeat of misconduct allegations and intervening tragedies at CPD maintained the 
high level of public interest and pressure on the consent decree process. The pressure from 
several stakeholders to finalize the consent decree weighed on the negotiations. On March 
27, 2018, the Chicago Tribune Editorial Board opined that “Chicagoans, too, should want 
the decree buttoned up as soon as possible. Chicago cops have the difficult mission of 
stopping crime and criminals. A rebuilt sense of trust from communities long alienated 
from the CPD should open the flow of information from law-abiding citizens who know 
who’s breaking which laws. The sooner reform enhances that relationship, the better.”213    
While civil lawsuits involving police misconduct had become commonplace in 
Chicago, a series of federal cases crystalized what had become a pattern of failed 
accountability mechanisms. In December 2017, in the middle of closing arguments after 
trial, the City paid $20 million to settle a wrongful death case filed against a CPD 
detective.214 The case settled only after it was revealed that the City had failed to disclose 
evidence of a past incident involving the same officer.215  
That incident marked only the latest in a string of failures to produce evidence in 
accordance with court orders. In the six and a half years from the beginning of Mayor 
Emanuel’s term to that point, the City had been sanctioned nine times in federal court alone 
for failure to comply with its legal obligations to produce evidence in police misconduct 
cases, incurring over $1 million in sanctions.216  
By summer of 2018, another civil trial was captivating the attention of the 
Chicagoans. The wrongful death case against officer Robert Rialmo proceeded in the 
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circuit court of Cook County.217 The case involved a police shooting from December 2015, 
when Rialmo responded to a father’s 911 call for help with a domestic disturbance when 
his son was having a mental health crisis.218 Rialmo saw the son, 19-year-old Quintonio 
LeGrier, ten feet or more away from him with a baseball bat.219 Rialmo shot and killed 
LeGrier and also accidentally killed LeGrier’s downstairs neighbor and bystander, 55-year-
old Bettie Jones.220 The trial turned on whether LeGrier swung the bat at Rialmo and how 
far LeGrier was from Rialmo when he fired.221 At the conclusion of the trial, jurors voted 
to award the family over $1 million and also ruled that the officer reasonably believed he 
had to fire to protect himself.222 The judge negated the verdict.223 Afterward, COPA 
recommended terminating Rialmo’s employment with CPD, but Superintendent Johnson 
disagreed, leaving the decision to the Chicago Police Board, which unanimously voted to 
terminate Rialmo.224 In September 2018, the City Council voted to settle the case brought 
by Bettie Jones’s family for $16 million.225    
At the same time, the general public maintained a constant focus on the continued 
drumbeat of violent crime statistics.226 While homicides in 2018 occurred at a lower level 
than the record-breaking years of 2016 and 2017, they still outpaced the levels of 2014 and 
2015.227 The public increasingly recognized the broken relationship between the police and 
the community as a barrier to reducing violence.228 This recognition created pressure to 
finalize the consent decree and institute reforms to improve community relations. For 
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example, the Chicago Tribune Editorial Board recognized the potential consent decree as 
a tool to both build community trust and reduce crime. “Negotiations between Emanuel 
and state Attorney General Lisa Madigan on a consent decree to monitor police reforms 
could help reimagine the relationship [between minority neighborhoods and the CPD]. 
When community members distrust cops on the beat, criminals take advantage.”229 
In the midst of this turmoil, in May 2018, the FOP organized a protest at a City 
Council meeting to object to the City’s actions and complain that the Mayor had “turned 
his back on the police.”230 In a flyer encouraging officers to attend the council meeting in 
protest, the union asserted that “Emanuel is selling officers out in a federal consent decree 
that would give anti-police groups a voice in police oversight.”231  
Local media perceived the Mayor as “caught between police reform advocates 
demanding a strong consent decree with rigid mandates and timetables and the need to 
coax police officers out of their defensive crouch to combat violent crime.”232 As a result, 
the Mayor announced that, with respect to his approach to the consent decree, he is “playing 
it down the middle of the fairway.”233  
H.  We Hit an Impasse on Recordation of Pointing a Firearm 
In a public status appearance in federal court on July 20, 2018, we announced that 
we had largely reached agreement with the City on the terms of the consent decree, but that 
the parties had an outstanding dispute on a single issue: whether or not CPD officers should 
be required to record each time a firearm is pointed at a person.234 We maintained these 
incidents needed to be reported, which CPD policy did not require.235  
Our office pursued this requirement, a common one in recent DOJ-negotiated 
consent decrees, in light of one of DOJ’s central findings: the manner in which CPD 
officers handled their firearms was intricately connected to the use of unreasonable 
force.236 CPD did not require officers to document when they display or point a firearm in 
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the course of conducting an investigatory stop or arrest. By contrast, the New York Police 
Department requires officers to document investigatory stops on a form that includes a 
specific box in which officers are to mark “Drawing/ Pointing Firearm” if it is one of the 
“Actions Taken to Stop and/or Detain.”237 Other cities with variations of this reporting 
requirement include Detroit, Dallas, Oakland, and Washington, D.C.238 
The community plaintiffs were swift to decry the impasse. “If this is the issue that 
they’re stuck on, I’m frankly shocked,” said Karen Sheley, an attorney of the ACLU of 
Illinois.239 Craig Futterman, a clinical law professor at the University of Chicago Law 
School and counsel for the Campbell plaintiffs, said “I’m surprised that that’s a point of 
any serious contention. It’s been accepted in other consent decrees. For a department 
engaged in a pattern of excessive force and committed to redressing it, it seems to me an 
obvious proposition, as opposed to something that would invite controversy.”240  
I. We Release a Draft Consent Decree While Negotiations Continue 
On July 27, 2018, we released a draft consent decree, without resolving the pointing 
of a firearm issue. Along with the Mayor and police superintendent, our office appeared at 
a “jam-packed, hour-long news conference in the Thompson Center” to announce the 
release of a voluminous draft for public comment.241  
We recognized the historic effort by commenting that, while many previous attempts 
at police reform have not brought the systemic and sustainable change that is required, and, 
speaking as Attorney General, Lisa Madigan announced that “it will be different this time.” 
She added, “[u]nlike those in the past, attempts to just talk the talk and not walk the walk 
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will be unsuccessful.”242 The parties announced that, in an unprecedented process of 
transparency and community engagement, the public would have twenty-one days to 
review and provide comments on the draft consent decree, and the parties would then 
review the public input and return to the negotiating table to revise the consent decree.243 
The Attorney General’s Office established a website and hotline through which members 
of the public could provide any reactions to the draft decree.244 The Editorial Board of the 
Chicago Sun-Times called on the public to review the draft and provide comments.245  
While the public welcomed the opportunity to review the consent decree prior to 
court filing, the disagreement between the parties on a requirement to report the pointing 
of a firearm dominated public discussion. When asked about the issue at the press 
conference, the disagreement between the parties was plain. In an effort to explain the 
City’s reluctance to agree to the requirement, Mayor Emanuel asserted that the requirement 
of recording the pointing of a firearm was not a key issue identified in the DOJ or PATF 
reports, even though the DOJ report explicitly highlighted this problem.246 The 
Superintendent explained that he did not want to put officers in a position in which they 
would hesitate to draw their weapons, and he did not want it to be a deterrent to good 
policing.247 Illinois Attorney General Madigan asserted that the pointing of a firearm ought 
to be tracked because other consent decrees carry such a provision, and pointing a gun 
constitutes a seizure under the Fourth Amendment. She also made clear we would litigate 
this issue if needed.248 Our expert, Ron Davis, explained, “[i]t is better to know the truth 
[of how often and when officers are pointing their firearms at members of the public] than 
to operate in a vacuum and just assume everything is fine. That is not OK in 2018.”249     
The editorial boards of both major Chicago newspapers took up the issue and argued 
that gun pointing should be documented. The day the consent decree was announced, the 
Sun-Times Editorial Board released an editorial entitled, “Every time a cop pulls a gun, it 
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should be documented.”250 It challenged: “City Hall ought to get fully on board.”251 The 
Chicago Tribune Editorial Board also stated that with respect to a gun being pointed, 
“simply pointing a gun is a use of force. It’s deadly serious.”252 Of the fact that 
Superintendent Johnson does not know how often his officers point a gun at someone, the 
Chicago Tribune declared, “officers deserve clarity. They aren’t going to get it from a 
department that doesn’t know when or why they are pointing their guns.”253 Such practices 
erode the community’s trust in the police and traumatize individuals and their families who 
have had guns pointed at them. 
While the negotiations about the pointing requirement continued, a new lawsuit 
arose. A father living on the city’s southwest side sued the City, asserting that two officers 
pointed their guns at his two young children after they burst through the front door while 
executing a search warrant at the wrong address.254 In response to a separate incident, 
weeks earlier the City Council had approved a $2.5 million dollar settlement in an 
excessive-force lawsuit that accused police of pointing a gun at the chest of a 3-year-old 
and striking her handcuffed mother.255 Their lawyer explained, “[i]t’s been so normalized 
by Chicago policing over the decades, and it happens with such regularity, that many of 
the citizens on the South and West sides that I talk to do not even know that it’s illegal 
policing to point a gun at a child for no reason.”256  
Still unable to reach an agreement on the issue, on August 29, 2018, we moved for 
permission from the Court to take the issue to trial.  We asked for “focused litigation on a 
single, limited issue”257 because the negotiations had not resulted in an agreement. No DOJ 
pattern or practice case regarding police misconduct had ever gone to trial,258 but the 
parties prepared to do just that as litigation got underway.  
After weeks of contentious meetings and dozens of proposals and counter proposals, 
on September 6, 2018, we announced an agreement to resolve the pointing issue with the 
City.259 We agreed that any time an officer points a gun at a person during an arrest or 
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street stop, they will call in to dispatchers by radio to inform them of the incident. The 
officer’s supervisor will be notified and must review each incident and associated body 
camera footage to ensure the officer followed CPD policy and that any misconduct is 
addressed.  
The agreement also requires CPD headquarters to review and audit all incidents 
involving an officer pointing a firearm at a person to, among other things, identify any 
patterns of misconduct and any need for tactical training. In addition, CPD will provide 
officers with instruction on weapons discipline and when officers should and should not 
point a firearm at a person. CPD also agreed to clarify in its policy that officers will only 
point a firearm at a person when it is objectively reasonable to do so.   
Reaching agreement on the requirement to record when officers point their firearms 
allowed the parties to finalize their changes to the consent decree based on the public 
comment period feedback.   
IV. REVISING THE CONSENT DECREE 
A. The Public Weighs In 
After the parties published the draft consent decree, they invited additional comments 
until August 17, 2018. As a result of the process, the parties received approximately 1,700 
additional comments and suggestions on the range of topics included in the consent decree, 
and many that were not.260  
The Coalition, largely composed of the Campbell and Community United plaintiffs, 
gave a presentation and told their experiences and truths to the parties. The Coalition shared 
input as to what they felt needed to be in the consent decree to both our Office and 
representatives from the City, including the Corporation Counsel, First Deputy Corporation 
Counsel, CPD leadership and the Deputy Mayor for Public Safety. 
Ultimately, the parties re-negotiated and changed several dozen provisions of the 
consent decree based on public input.   
Some of the most significant changes related to the publication of data on police 
practices, increased transparency, and additional requirements that CPD consider 
community input as it creates policy. For example, the consent decree requires that CPD 
publish the source data for its annual assessment of policing practices and break out the 
data by race and gender.261 Based on multiple complaints of excessive force used by police 
officers against students in schools, the parties included policies related to CPD officers in 
Chicago Public Schools. The consent decree requires that CPD seek out and consider the 
input of students, parents, and community stakeholders in developing those policies.262   
In another significant area of improvement, the parties ensured additional protections 
and resources for people with disabilities. Specifically, the revised consent decree requires 
that CPD use qualified interpreters to communicate with people who are deaf or hard of 
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hearing, train officers to recognize and respond to conduct related to an individual’s 
disability, and designate an Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) liaison to coordinate 
its compliance with the ADA.263 The changes also require the inclusion of individuals who 
have personally experienced a behavioral or mental health crisis in the City’s crisis 
intervention response advisory committee, and that CPD perform additional recordkeeping 
of service to people with disabilities.264 On September 13, 2018, the parties filed the revised 
consent decree with the Court, seeking the approval of Judge Robert M. Dow, Jr., the judge 
assigned to the case, and asking the Court to enter the decree as a final court order.   
Given the intense public interest in the consent decree, on September 19, 2018, the 
Court encouraged members of the public who wanted to comment on the Court’s 
consideration of the proposed consent decree to do so in writing.265 In response to Judge 
Dow’s order providing for the opportunity to comment, over 500 public comments were 
filed, 266 more than three times the number that had been filed in any DOJ police reform 
consent decree.267 
Members of the Coalition filed extensive written comments with the Court, asking it 
to adopt provisions of an alternative Chicago Community Consent Decree, which had been 
drafted by community groups and included their recommendations.268 While the Coalition  
recognized and acknowledged that many of their provisions had been adopted by the parties 
in the consent decree, they posited that the “historic potential will only be fully realized if 
the final consent decree contains the provisions outlined here, which are deemed essential 
by Chicago’s communities most affected by police violence and misconduct.”269   
In addition to receiving written comments, Judge Dow also held extensive fairness 
hearings over two days, on October 24-25, 2018, to provide the public an opportunity to 
comment on the proposed consent decree in person. Because of the significant demand to 
participate in the hearings, speakers were limited to five minutes, and the Court 
administered a lottery to determine who would be permitted to speak and in what order.270  
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The fairness hearings gave community members an important public forum to share 
with the federal judge their experiences with CPD. Ninety-six individuals addressed the 
court during the two-day public hearings.271 The hearings took place in the Dirksen Federal 
Building’s ceremonial courtroom, the largest courtroom space available in the Chicago 
courthouse, with an overflow courtroom to accommodate additional observers.   
For two days, the Court heard from community members, organizers, representatives 
of religious communities, attorneys, and police officers. Many members of the community 
spoke of their own experiences with the CPD and supported the consent decree as a vehicle 
to address the problems they had personally experienced. Angelica Nieves described how 
an off-duty officer killed her brother after that officer had stalked, harassed, and threatened 
him.272 Her brother had called 911 to report the officer several times prior to the incident.273 
According to Ms. Nieves, the officer had twenty citations, a prior suspension, and orders 
of protection in place prior to the incident. 274 “My family chain is broken. My only brother 
was taken, my parents’ only son was taken, and my children’s only uncle was taken from 
us.”275 
The Court heard stories of youth who were so frequently touched during CPD 
searches that they routinely put their hands up to be cuffed to a chain link fence without 
being asked to do so;276 of a sixty-year-old Latino man who felt embarrassed when his 
neighbors saw police hold him up against a car;277 of a mother who was not allowed to see 
her 19-year-old son after he was shot by officers;278 of a fifteen-year-old and her friends 
who were handcuffed to a chain fence;279 of a developmentally disabled man knocked 
down and handcuffed;280 of a man who was apprehended and whose home was searched 
based on the false identification of a witness;281 of a woman who reported that she had 
been raped by an officer but had not been contacted by anyone from the City investigating 
her claim;282 and of a college student who was grabbed, tackled to the ground, beaten, and 
thrown into a police wagon while he was participating in a protest.283 One senior citizen 
told a story of having an officer stick a gun under the hood hair dryer she was sitting under 
when her hairdresser’s home was raided by the police.284   
Two pastors—one African American, one white—told personal stories from their 
lives and congregations about interactions with the police. An African American pastor 
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told of being detained, questioned, and having his home searched when the alarm system 
in his new home sounded. “Absent my collar and my suit, I and my son, and even my 
daughter, become potentially targets.”285 A white pastor from a congregation in a 
predominately white area of the city explained that their church has budgeted to pay for an 
Uber to transport one of their African-American elders who has been stopped by police 
repeatedly on his commute to church via public transportation.286 
Many community members urged the Court to make additions to the consent decree. 
The Coalition submitted nearly 100 pages of written comments to the Court based largely 
on the Chicago Community Consent Decree. While they were supportive of the consent 
decree, they asked the court not to miss the opportunity to do more.287 As one of them 
explained, “[t]he reason we are here today and saying that a consent decree is necessary, it 
is our course of last resort.”288 
More than a half-dozen current and former CPD patrol officers also testified.  They 
uniformly opposed the consent decree. Nearly all of the patrol officers who testified 
identified an affiliation with the FOP. The President of the FOP, Kevin Graham, testified 
that he had spoken to U.S. Attorney General Jeff Sessions, who he reported was “against 
this consent decree.”289 Officers commonly expressed the concern that the consent decree 
would “tie the hands of police officers,”290 and they disagreed that additional oversight of 
the Department was needed. One officer testified: 
The people of this city don’t need this decree or any more oversight of the 
police. There are more levels of oversight than there are days in the week. 
What they need are members of the police department who feel that they’re 
being treated fairly and justly by their employers, by the media, and by those 
organizations that exist sometimes to create purpose for themselves.291  
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They also argued that the parties overlooked the significance of violent crime, which 
they asserted was the problem. Financial Secretary of the FOP Michael Garza said, “Police 
didn’t make this environment. The criminals made this environment.”292    
While several speakers noted the substantial disconnect between the community and 
the officers at the hearing, one community member summarized the problem: “when we 
have mothers who feel like they can’t tell their children to call the police, to trust the police, 
to look to them to solve a dangerous situation, you can’t possibly protect the 
community.”293 
B.  The Calls for Reform Continue 
Even while the consent decree was under consideration by the Court, the calls for 
action did not end. Community members and activists, including the Shriver Center on 
Poverty Law, urged the City to act on some issues even in advance of finalization of the 
consent decree.294 The City’s Inspector General Office issued a report on school resource 
officers, criticizing the CPD for not having clear directives for how it selects, trains, and 
evaluates school resource officers.295 The Inspector General reported that neither the police 
department nor the school district has a set agreement with written rules, roles or 
responsibilities for the school officers, instead relying on a police department general order 
over thirty years old, dating from 1988.296 The consent decree also addressed this very 
concern with school resource officers. In response to the Inspector General’s report, there 
was a public call to take action. The Chicago Sun-Times Editorial Board asserted that 
“some things can’t wait,” urging CPD to improve standards for school resource officers 
without further delay.297 A 2017 report by the Shriver Center on Poverty Law, Handcuffs 
in Hallways, noted that the City had paid more than $2 million between 2012 and 2016 to 
settle legal complaints against CPD officers assigned to schools.298  
In addition, the Department continued to be plagued by tragedy and mental health 
crises as three officers committed suicide on police department grounds or while on duty 
in August and September 2018 alone.299 The number of counselors available for CPD 
officers was historically low and continued to be during this time, as the DOJ report 
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highlighted. Changes to staffing levels for mental health resources available to CPD 
officers was a key component of the consent decree, which required the City to increase 
the number of counselors available to ten.300 
Adding to the tension in the city, in September 2018, officer Jason Van Dyke went 
on trial for the murder of Laquan McDonald. He was convicted of second-degree murder 
and sixteen counts of aggravated battery. “Throughout Chicago’s neighborhoods, L trains 
and offices, just before 2 p.m. Friday, as the verdict came down, the city stood, 
transfixed.”301 However, though the verdict felt like a vindication for many community 
members—that for the first time in the city’s history, a police officer would be held 
criminally responsible for killing a young, Black man, the sentence eventually handed 
down by the Judge in January 2019 was only six and a half years and would likely result 
in Van Dyke serving only three years in prison.302 The community’s outrage was 
palpable.303 
V. APPROVAL BY THE COURT 
A. DOJ and FOP Take One Last Crack at Undermining the Consent Decree 
In late August, the Court denied the FOP’s motion to intervene in the litigation, 
finding that the motion, filed more than nine months after the complaint, was not timely.304 
The Court described in detail the outreach efforts of the parties, including to the FOP, and 
found that the union must have known about its interests in the suit when the case was 
filed.305 The Court agreed that, in light of the late stage of the negotiations and the 
completion of a voluminous draft consent decree, the parties would be prejudiced by the 
late intervention of a new party.306 
The parties’ efforts to seek input from the FOP and officers demonstrated to the Court 
that to “the extent the FOP’s interests have not been fully vetted in the drafting of the 
consent decree to date, that deficiency is at least in part a self-inflicted wound. Allowing 
intervention now would undoubtedly delay the proceedings to the detriment of the original 
parties’ interests.”307 
The Court recognized that FOP has a significant interest in the consent decree, as its 
members will be working under its terms for years to come.308  However, the Court relied 
on the “carve-out” language negotiated by the parties, reasoning that the language required 
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the City to make any changes to the CBAs at the bargaining table, rather than in the consent 
decree, and adequately protected the ability of the FOP to raise any provisions they 
perceive to be conflicts with the CBA at the time the court reviews and considers the 
consent decree for approval.309 The FOP then appealed the Court’s ruling to the Seventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals.   
Even without party status, the union provided extensive briefing and written 
comments to the consent decree. The union filed a fifty-four-page brief opposing the 
consent decree and asserting that dozens of provisions violated the CBA or state law.310 In 
its comments, the FOP objected to nearly eighty separate reforms included in the consent 
decree, arguing that they violated a variety of laws, their CBA, and that they would 
jeopardize officer safety.311  
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the ruling of the district court on January 2, 2019.312  
In denying the FOP’s motion to intervene, the Seventh Circuit held that these provisions 
made clear that the parties “do not intend for the consent decree to be interpreted as 
impairing CBA rights.”313 Notably, the Seventh Circuit found the FOP’s decision to wait 
nearly nine months to file its motion fatal, citing the FOP’s own repeated public comments 
about the consent decree as evidence that it was aware of the intersection between the 
consent decree and its CBA.314 Informal discussions throughout the second half of 2017 
and into 2018 also indicated that the FOP was aware of ongoing negotiations between the 
parties and had ample opportunity to file a motion to intervene earlier.315 
The Court held that “[i]f the parties interpret the consent decree in a way which 
violates CBA rights, the [FOP] can avail itself of normal remedies for CBA violations.”316 
“As things stand now, the consent decree cannot impair the CBA or state law rights enjoyed 
by Chicago police officers. That will change only if the district court concludes that federal 
law requires the abrogation of those rights.”317 
The FOP, however, felt they had additional support from the Trump Administration 
as they tried to stop the consent decree. On September 18, 2018, Attorney General Sessions 
traveled to the northern suburbs of Chicago to deliver a speech at a police convention, 
blaming Chicago’s homicide rate on the cessation of stop-and-frisk practices.318 Attorney 
General Sessions remarked, “[t]here’s a clear lesson here: if you want more shootings and 
more death, then listen to the ACLU, Black Lives Matter, or Antifa. If you want public 
safety, then listen to the police professionals who have been studying this for 35 years.”319 
Similarly, on the Monday following the conviction of Jason Van Dyke, President 
Trump announced that he would send Sessions to “go to the great city of Chicago to help 
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straighten out the terrible shooting wave,” commenting on the “horrible deal” that the City 
had entered into with the ACLU to reduce the use of stop-and-frisk.320 The next day, 
Sessions announced that DOJ would oppose the consent decree by filing a statement of 
interest with the federal court, despite Sessions’ 2017 memo designating police reform and 
consent decrees to state and local authorities, not the DOJ.321 The FOP issued a statement 
approving of DOJ’s position: “we are exceedingly grateful that President Trump and AG 
Sessions are opposing this consent decree.”322 
The following week, Attorney General Sessions traveled to Chicago to address the 
Chicago Crime Commission, referring to the consent decree as “an insult” to the 
Department and that “the proposed consent decree would transfer control to two retiring 
politicians and a federal judge.”323   
In the statement of interest DOJ filed with the Court, DOJ opposed entry of the 
consent decree, asserting that the Court should instead “allow state and local officials—
and Chicago’s brave front-line police officers—to engage in flexible and localized efforts 
to advance the goal of safe, effective, and constitutional policing in Chicago.”324  In its 
blind efforts to stop the consent decree that was, in part, the product of its own 
investigation, DOJ ignored the fact that the consent decree was the result of negotiations 
between state and local officials, including police officers, that DOJ purported to endorse 
in its statement of interest.   
B.  The District Court Approves the Consent Decree 
On January 31, 2019, a few weeks after the Seventh Circuit affirmed the denial of 
the FOP’s motion to intervene, the district court entered an order approving the consent 
decree in its original proposed form.325 The Court acknowledged its review of the many 
comments submitted to the Court suggesting changes to the contents of the decree, but the 
court ultimately declined these requests, noting the extensive role of public input in the 
development and revision of the proposed consent decree before it was filed for court 
approval. 326 As Judge Dow wrote, “[t]he final decree that the court approves today thus 
represents the culmination of an enormous undertaking by the parties and the thousands of 
others who have participated in the wide range of opportunities for community input.”327 
 
320 Suzannah Gonzales & Steve Holland, Trump Advocates ‘Stop-and-Frisk’ to Curtail Chicago Crime, 
U.S. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2018), https://www.usnews.com/news/top-news/articles/2018-10-08/trump-advocates-
stop-and-frisk-to-curtail-chicago-crime.html. 
321 Daniel Tucker & Nereida Moreno, AG Madigan Rebukes Jeff Sessions Over Plan to Block CPD Consent 
Decree, WBEZ (Oct. 10, 2018), https://www.wbez.org/shows/morning-shift/ag-madigan-rebukes-jeff-
sessions-over-plan-to-block-cpd-consent-decree/d4f56d2d-394e-46ec-a49a-5097c0ce522f.html. 
322 Fran Spielman, Rahm Says Trump Administration Threat to Cop Decree Ain’t on the Level’, CHI. SUN-
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/2018/10/10/18468415/rahm-says-trump-
administration-threat-to-cop-decree-ain-t-on-the-level.html. 
323 Aamer Madhani, Sessions: Chicago Police Consent Decree Plan ‘Colossal Mistake’ Pushed by Lame-
Duck Mayor, USA TODAY (Oct. 19, 2018, 3:32 PM), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2018/10/19/jeff-sessions-chicago-police-department-homicide-
consent-decree-rahm-emanuel/1694719002/.html.   
324 United States’ Statement of Interest Opposing Proposed Consent Decree at 11, Illinois v. City of 
Chicago, 2019 WL 398703, ECF No. 160.  
325 Illinois v. City of Chicago, 2019 WL 398703398703.  
326 Id. at *4. 
327 Id. at *4.   
NORTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY   [2020 
 164
In response to the FOP’s numerous concerns about areas of potential conflict 
between their CBA and the consent decree, the district court found the union’s rights 
remain adequately protected by the “carve-out” language in the consent decree.328 The 
Court held that the consent decree cannot alter the existing CBA without the union’s assent, 
and that the “carve-out” language in the consent decree adequately protects existing CBA 
provisions and rights under state law. 329   
While the Court did not analyze or resolve each of the FOP’s assertions of conflict 
with the CBA, it did emphasize that many of the reforms addressed in the consent decree 
will need to be determined during CBA negotiations between the City and the unions, who 
will “bargain in the shadow of all applicable law.”330 The Court pointedly observed that a 
desire to terminate a consent decree and end court oversight is a strong incentive to reach 
agreement on CBA-related matters, citing two consent decrees in which City agencies had 
been subject to federal court oversight for nearly fifty years.331 
C. The Selection of an Independent Monitor and Special Master 
At the same time the Court was considering the proposed consent decree, the parties 
were negotiating the selection of the independent monitor. On October 18, 2018, the parties 
announced that they had narrowed the field to four finalist teams, including two teams from 
the Chicago area, and two from Washington, D.C. and New York. The parties hosted two 
public forums to seek public input, held in the basement of the State of Illinois building. 
The parties also created an Engaged Stakeholder Committee made up of individuals and 
organizations engaged in advocacy on policing matters in Chicago. The committee 
interviewed and provided input to the parties on the four independent monitor finalists.   
On March 1, 2019, the court appointed Maggie Hickey and her team as independent 
monitor.332 In his order appointing Hickey as independent monitor, Judge Dow also 
appointed retired U.S. District Judge David H. Coar to serve as a special master assisting 
the Court. “[T]he Master will be a facilitator and problem-solver on specific tasks that fall 
outside the areas which the Monitor is best suited to handle.”333  The Court explained: 
The parties and the court have concluded that, in view of the complexity of 
this case, a Master as authorized under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
should be appointed to perform certain tasks that fall outside the scope of 
the Monitor’s duties or would involve more time intensive involvement than 
either the Monitor or the Court can devote to the issue. Under the terms of 
the decree, the Monitor is tasked with an enormous array of duties across 
an almost staggering array of topics.334 
Under the consent decree, the monitor must conduct surveys of a broad cross-section 
of the Chicago community within 180 days and every two years thereafter.335 The monitor 
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will prepare annual monitoring plans that include a schedule for compliance reviews and 
audits and the methodology for such reviews.336 The monitor will publish semi-annual 
reports on compliance and a comprehensive assessment after three years.337 The monitor 
is also required to hold public meetings and meet with Coalition representatives, CPD 
officers, and the collective bargaining representatives of the CPD.338 All policies will be 
submitted to the monitor and the Illinois Attorney General’s Office for review, comment, 
and, if necessary, objection.339 The consent decree requires that CPD’s plans for reform 
must be approved by the monitor prior to implementation by the Department.340 
The monitor will conduct a comprehensive assessment of the department after three 
years to determine whether and to what extent the City and CPD are in compliance with 
the decree. After that assessment, the court will determine whether to renew the monitor’s 
appointment.  
Recognizing the cost of the independent monitor’s annual $2.85 million budget, the 
Court acknowledged that, while it is a “large expenditure of money by any measure,” in 
context, if a monitoring team had been in place since the inception of Chicago and billed 
the City at the rate of “$2.85 million per year since 1790, when Jean Baptiste Point du 
Sable first set up camp at the mouth of the Chicago River, the total bill of $652.65 million 
would not equal the City’s litigation-related payouts in civil rights actions since 2004.”341 
VI. THE CPD CONSENT DECREE IS A NATIONAL BLUEPRINT FOR POLICE REFORM 
We knew taking on Chicago police reform would be difficult work, but we believe 
we have created a template for other states and cities to replicate, and we are optimistic 
that the tireless commitment by our entire team to the process of police reform will result 
in transformation for all residents of the City of Chicago.  
The consent decree calls for substantial and wide-reaching reform of CPD’s policies, 
practices, training, and accountability mechanisms.342 Its goal is to ensure that CPD 
delivers services in a manner that (1) fully complies with the Constitution and federal and 
state laws; (2) respects the rights of the people of Chicago; (3) builds trust between officers 
and the communities they serve; and (4) promotes community and officer safety.343   
Many of the provisions included in the consent decree echo similar provisions in 
consent decrees in other jurisdictions after DOJ investigated and recommended comparable 
remedies for unconstitutional conduct by police. In drafting the decree, we drew from 
reforms instituted in other cities as a result of DOJ agreements, as these reflect professional 
standards to which all police departments should subscribe. Other aspects of the consent 
decree break new ground, such as provisions providing transparency by requiring CPD to 
publish data regarding use of force incidents and provisions significantly expanding the 
support services provided to CPD officers. To ensure that the reforms become ingrained in 
CPD principles and structure, the standard for compliance in the consent decree requires 
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that CPD incorporates each substantive provision into policy, adequately trains on the 
policy, and carries out the policy requirement in actual practice.344 
The consent decree addresses a broad range of topics, including impartial policing, 
community policing, crisis intervention, use of force; recruitment, hiring, and promotion; 
training; supervision; officer wellness and support; accountability and transparency; and 
data collection, analysis, and management.  
A. Impartial Policing 
Both DOJ and PATF concluded that CPD’s pattern of unconstitutional policing and 
use of force disproportionately impacted people of color.345 “These enforcement actions 
have deepened a widespread perception that police are indiscriminately targeting anyone 
and everyone in communities of color without making individualized determinations of 
reasonable suspicion of criminal conduct.”346 This widespread belief was echoed by the 
President of the Cook County Board, Toni Preckwinkle, who remarked to the press: “I 
always believed that the police could shoot black and brown people with impunity. And 
I’m the president of the county, and I believe that.  So, what do people on the street believe? 
Probably the same as me.”347 
The consent decree requires CPD to conduct impartial policing training for all 
officers annually.348 The decree requires training for officers on hate crimes and a revision 
of those policies.349 The Department will require officers to immediately report to a 
supervisor all incidents where they observe other CPD officers engaging in misconduct, 
including discrimination or profiling.350 The decree also seeks to improve CPD interactions 
with diverse communities through policies and training on providing services to members 
of religious communities, LGBTQ+ individuals, children and youth, and individuals with 
limited English proficiency.351 The decree includes the provision of reasonable 
accommodations, ensuring effective communication, and designating an ADA liaison.352 
Significantly, the consent decree requires CPD to assess its patterns of misdemeanor arrests 
and citations by race and gender and address disparities.353 Journalists reported that the 
City handed out more tickets for minor offenses—including riding a bicycle on the 
sidewalk and failure to shovel snow— in parts of the city with some of the highest 
concentrations of African-American residents.354 The assessment of CPD’s practices 
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promotes accountability and transparency through an annual review and assessment of 
misdemeanor arrests and citations for race and gender-based disparate impact and the 
publication of the underlying data.355 In addition, the consent decree requires CPD to 
develop a new policy that prohibits sexual misconduct by CPD officers.356 
B. Community Policing 
Community policing principles include trust and legitimacy, community 
engagement, community partnerships, problem-solving, and collaboration.357 The CPD’s 
Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) program, which had once been considered 
a national model, had by 2016 become a decentralized, neglected, and underfunded 
program, receiving only about 0.3% of CPD’s budget—less than one-third of its allocation 
in 1999.358 As Chicago’s community policing program withered, the national consensus 
on the benefits of community policing grew. For example, in May 2015, the President’s 
Task Force on 21st Century Policing recommended that “law enforcement agencies should 
develop and adopt policies and strategies that reinforce the importance of community 
engagement in managing public safety.”359  
Throughout the agreement, the consent decree requires CPD to integrate community 
policing principles throughout CPD’s operations.360 For example, the consent decree 
requires the Department to put in place criteria for selecting and evaluating school 
resources officers.361 Prior to the consent decree, neither Chicago Public Schools nor CPD 
had policies defining the role of CPD officers stationed in public schools, nor did CPD 
have any specialized training for officers assigned to schools despite reports documenting 
systemic problems with the conduct of those officers.362 The decree also promotes positive 
interactions with youth through revised policies and trainings, regular meetings to seek 
input from a diverse cross-section of Chicago youth, community partnerships, and the 
exercise of discretion to use alternatives to arrest or referral to juvenile court.363 
C. Crisis Intervention  
The consent decree aims at promoting the use of crisis intervention techniques in 
order to reduce the need to use force, to facilitate access to the healthcare system rather 
than the criminal justice system, and to decrease unnecessary criminal justice 
involvement.364 The decree requires CPD to begin providing all officers with regular crisis 
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intervention training.365 Certified crisis intervention officers will receive additional 
ongoing training, and CPD must develop a plan to ensure that a sufficient number of CIT 
officers can respond to calls for service involving individuals in crisis.366 The agreement 
also requires initial and refresher mental health and awareness training for 911 operators 
so they can better spot and triage crisis calls.367   
D. Use of Force 
Use of force was a critical issue, and an area that DOJ and PATF had identified a 
need for significant training and reform. The consent decree requires officers to use de-
escalation techniques in potential and ongoing use of force incidents, including using time 
as a tactic to slow down the pace of an incident, creating distance between the officer and 
the potential threat, requesting assistance from other officers or specialized units, and using 
trauma-informed techniques, including acknowledging confusion or mistrust.368 Officers 
are prohibited from using deadly force against a person who is only a threat to herself or 
himself or to property.369 Officers are prohibited from firing at moving vehicles, except in 
extreme circumstances as a last resort to preserve human life or prevent great bodily 
harm.370 In addition, an individual fleeing a scene, without any other basis for suspicion, 
does not justify use of a Taser.371 CPD must train and equip officers to provide life-saving 
aid and require officers to provide such aid following officer use of force incidents and 
prior to the arrival of emergency services.372 The consent decree requires monthly 
publication of use of force data and requires supervisory review of use of force incidents 
and referral of instances that may violate the law or CPD policy to COPA.373  
At least as important as clarifying and strengthening CPD’s rules about use of force 
is the unprecedented reporting and oversight when force is used, to ensure accountability 
for both individual officers and CPD. The consent decree broadened the categories of uses 
of force that must be reported to include the use of any force by a CPD officer to overcome 
the active resistance of a subject.374 The decree also requires supervisors to review all uses 
of force, with more serious uses of force requiring a supervisor to come to the scene and 
take statements from witnesses.375  
E. Recruitment, Hiring, and Promotion 
The community provided significant feedback about hiring and tremendous input 
from officers about the promotions’ process. Officers are deeply skeptical about the 
fairness of the current system of promotions. The consent decree requires that CPD have 
clear guidance on its policies and procedures for recruiting, hiring, and promoting officers. 
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The decree mandates that CPD conduct an assessment of recruitment and hiring efforts 
every three years that specifically considers, among other things, methods for addressing 
discriminatory and biased hiring practices. Prior to December 2019, promotions in CPD 
occurred either through testing or through a merit promotion system, which relied on 
internal nominations from CPD command staff376 and some aspects of an officer’s 
background, including disciplinary history, were not determinative or might not even be 
considered. Under the consent decree, CPD must obtain independent expert assessments 
of its promotions process to ensure lawfulness and transparency.377 Also, under the consent 
decree, CPD must account for discipline of officers before promoting them.378    
F. Training 
In response to the Laquan McDonald video being released, CPD instituted, for the 
first time in its history, a mandatory in-service training program on use of force for officers. 
Superintendent Johnson has remarked that, before 2017, the last time he received use of 
force training was more than three decades ago at the police academy.379 The consent 
decree requires that the annual training will be informed by a needs assessment, which will 
take into account patterns observed by CPD, as well as the input from the community, and 
that, by 2021, officers will receive forty hours of in-service training annually.380  
Importantly, the consent decree strengthens the rigor of the training for new officers, 
by requiring the Police Academy to incorporate adult learning principles and experiential, 
hands-on training—not just classroom lectures. In addition, the decree requires that 
probationary police officers—officers that have graduated from the Academy and have 
taken an additional nine months of hands-on learning in a police district beat with a Field 
Training Officer—will be assigned a field training officer with a 1:1 ratio.381 This 
additional requirement marks significant change from past trends in CPD, which had in 
some cases had three probationary police officers to a single Field Training Officer.382 
G. Supervision 
Currently, CPD officers do not have one regular supervisor. Instead, they may be 
under the command of a different supervisor on each shift, and that sergeant could have as 
many as 20 officers under his or her command during a shift. A lack of consistent, 
accountable supervision contributes to many of the accountability failures in CPD. For 
years, CPD had failed to meet the best practice standard of a 1:10 ratio of supervisor to 
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officers. The consent decree requires that CPD design and implement a staffing model that 
will require officers have a regular supervisor, and that supervisors not be responsible for 
more than ten officers at a time.383 The decree also requires annual performance 
evaluations be conducted by supervisors who have directly supervised an officer.384  
H. Officer Wellness and Support 
Addressing the CPD suicide rate and the need for mental health services for law 
enforcement officers was a priority for the consent decree. The consent decree aims to put 
in place adequate support systems to treat mental health, substance abuse, emotional 
challenges, and other job-related stressors in order to achieve a healthy, effective, 
constitutionally compliant police force. The decree requires an immediate increase in the 
number of licensed mental health professional staff available to CPD members and ensures 
that they have reasonable access to counseling. The decree provides for the development 
and implementation of a training and communications program related to officer wellness 
as well as the development of a comprehensive suicide initiative. Finally, the decree 
requires training for supervisors to recognize the signs and symptoms of alcoholism and 
substance abuse and how to recommend appropriate support services.  
I. Accountability and Transparency 
The consent decree includes a fifty-two-page section implementing numerous 
reforms intended to ensure accountability for police misconduct by strengthening and 
improving coordination among the various oversight agencies, such as COPA and the 
Police Board, that have come into existence in response to Chicago’s long and uniquely 
troubling history of police misconduct directed toward African American communities.  
The consent decree provides for greater transparency at all stages of misconduct 
investigations through the requirement that each complaint is assigned a unique tracking 
number that, by 2020, members of the public can use to track the status of complaints 
online. The decree requires that COPA and Bureau of Internal Affairs (BIA) complete 
investigations within 180 days and that district-level complaints and investigations are 
completed within 90 days.  
The provisions of the CBA with the union have been identified as containing several 
provisions that are impediments to reform, particularly with respect to accountability and 
transparency. While the consent decree does not re-write those provisions, it does require 
the City to make changes to its policies and practices when not explicitly prohibited by the 
agreement and to use best efforts to renegotiate highlighted problematic provisions, 
including the affidavit requirement, the bar on anonymous complaints, and the destruction 
of disciplinary records. The decree also requires CPD to adopt policies and practices to 
encourage and protect officers who report misconduct and expressly prohibits retaliation 
against members of the public who report misconduct. However, what the consent decree 
was not able to solve is the disjointed system of accountability, as set up through ordinance 
and the CBAs. Thus, the accountability system governing the CPD remains fragmented, 
with at least three different bodies having jurisdiction over complaints.   
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J. Data Collection, Analysis, and Management 
Police professionals and scholars have known for decades that genuine 
accountability requires more than just addressing serious misconduct after it occurs. While 
this is critical, supervisors should “identify those officers who are engaged in problematic 
behavior before this behavior has resulted in clear violations of law or policy” so that 
officers’ practices can be corrected.385 The consent decree requires implementation of an 
automated electronic system that enables supervisors to proactively identify at-risk 
behavior by officers under their command and to provide individualized interventions and 
support to address problematic behavior.  
* * * * 
The case we brought against the City of Chicago, the approach we took and the 
roadmap for reform laid out in the consent decree is a path that no state Attorney General 
had taken before on this scale. However, we committed the resources and demonstrated 
how, with a strong dedication to the community and the police department, to put in place 
a roadmap to genuine reform. In an era where DOJ has abdicated its responsibility to 
address patterns and practices of misconduct in police departments, other state and local 
government lawyers can follow this example and step into that void. 
VII.  LOOKING FORWARD 
“The citizens of this city are demanding justice. Communities are crying for peace 
in their neighborhoods. . . [w]e need healing and hope in this city, and this consent decree 
will provide it. I look forward to seeing that day.”386 
Shortly after the appointment of the independent monitor, Chicago held its next 
municipal election. Lori Lightfoot, the former chair of the Police Board and head of PATF, 
was elected mayor.  
Attorney General Kwame Raoul, who in January 2019 was sworn in, has expressed 
his commitment to continuing the important work we achieved in reaching a consent decree 
to govern Chicago police reform.  
The consent decree is in effect, and reform deadlines and requirements are coming 
due with a heavy drumbeat of community demand for change. With a new mayor, a new 
attorney general, and the appointment of an independent monitor, in Judge Dow’s words, 
“Let us begin.”387 
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